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THE IRONIC PRIVACY ACT
MARGARET HU*
ABSTRACT
This Article contends that the Privacy Act of 1974, a law intended to
engender trust in government records, can be implemented in a way that
inverts its intent. Specifically, pursuant to the Privacy Act's reporting
requirements, in September 2017, the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) notified the public that record systems would be modified to
encompass the collection of social media data. The notification justified the
collection of social media data as a part of national security screening and
immigration vetting procedures. However, the collection will encompass
social media data on both citizens and noncitizens, and was not explicitly
authorized by Congress. Social media surveillance programs by federal
agencies are largely unregulated and the announcement of social media
data collection pursuant to the reporting requirements of the Privacy Act
deserves careful legal attention. Trust in the Privacy Act is at risk when the
Act's notice requirements announce social media data collection and
analysis systems under the guise of modifying record collection and
retention protocols. This Article concludes that the social media data
collection program proposed by DHS in September 2017 requires express
legislative authorization.
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INTRODUCTION
Social media surveillance' tools allow the government to collect,
aggregate, and analyze billions of pieces of social media data points.2 With
approximately "2.3 billion active social media users[,],, 3 the ubiquity and
public availability of social media4 allows the government to monitor those
I. Multiple authors have helped to define and interrogate the impact of social media
surveillance. See generally SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT
FOR A HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER (2019); SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, ANTISOCIAL
MEDIA: HOW FACEBOOK DISCONNECTS US AND UNDERMINES DEMOCRACY (2018); Rachel Levinson-
Waldman, Government Access to and Manipulation of Social Media: Legal and Policy Challenges, 61
HOWARD L.J. 523 (2018); Danielle Keats Citron, Fulfilling Government's 2.0's Promise with Robust
Privacy Protections, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 822 (2010) [hereinafter Citron, Government 2.0]; Danah
Boyd, Social Network Sites as Networked Publics: Affordances, Dynamics and Implications, in A
NETWORKED SELF: IDENTITY, COMMUNITY AND CULTURE ON SOCIAL NETWORK SITES 39,39-58 (Zizi
Papacharissi ed., 2011); Christian Fuchs, Social Media Surveillance, in HANDBOOK OF DIGITAL
POLITICS 395 (Stephen Coleman & Deen Freelon eds., 2016); CHRISTIAN FUCHS, SOCIAL NETWORKING
SITES AND THE SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY (2009); Daniel Trottier & David Lyon, Key Features of Social
Media Surveillance, in INTERNET AND SURVEILLANCE: THE CHALLENGES OF WEB 2.0 AND SOCIAL
MEDIA 89, 89-105 (Christian Fuchs, Kees Boersma, Anders Albrechtslund & Marisol Sandoval eds.,
2012); Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1185(2016); Jeramie D. Scott, Social Media and Government Surveillance: The Case for Better Privacy
Protections for Our Newest Public Space, 12 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 151 (2017); Neil Richards & Woodrow
Hartzog, Privacy's Trust Gap, 126 YALE L.J. 1180 (2017); Anupam Chander, National Data
Governance in a Global Economy, U.C. DAVIS LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER NO. 495 (2016); Ari
Ezra Waldman, Privacy as Trust: Sharing Personal Information in a Networked World, 69 UNIV. MIAMI
L. REV. 559 (2015); FAIZA PATEL, RACHEL LEVINSON-WALDMAN, SOPHIA DENUYL, & RAYA KOREH,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, SOCIAL MEDIA MONITORING (2019) [hereinafter SOCIAL MEDIA
MONITORING REPORT].
2. See, e.g., Justin Jouvenal, The New Way Police Are Surveilling You: Calculating Your Threat
'Score,' WASH. POST (Jan. 10, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/the-new-
way-police-are-surveilling-you-calculating-your-threat-score/2016/01/1 0/e42bccac_8e 15-11 e5-baf4-
bdf37355da0c story.html [https://perma.cc/5CRG-DSNP] (noting aggregation of data allows for
analysis of "billions of data points, including arrest reports, property records, commercial databases,
deep Web searches and [a] man's social-media postings"); see also RACHEL LEVINSON-WALDMAN,
WHAT THE GOVERNMENT DOES WITH AMERICANS' DATA (2013).
3. Hugh Handeyside, To the Government, Your Latest Facebook Rant is Raw Intel, ACLU
BLOG (Sept. 26, 2016, 2:15 PM), https://www.aclu.orgfblog/privacy-technology/intemet-privacy/gover
nment-your-latest-facebook-rant-raw-intel [https://perma.cc/5 SJ9-Z5YY].
4. Important research by privacy scholars has explored the challenges of protecting privacy
rights in an Information Society. See generally JULIE COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: LEGAL
CONSTRUCTIONS OF INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM (2019); WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY'S
BLUEPRINT: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE DESIGN OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES (2018); DAVID GRAY, THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE (2017); NElL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL
PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL AGE (2015); FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK
Box SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015); JULIE
COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF (2012); CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE
NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (2008); MARK ANDREJEVIC, ISPY:
SURVEILLANCE AND POWER IN THE INTERACTIVE ERA (2007); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL
PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE DIGITAL AGE (2006); Danielle Keats Citron & Frank
Pasquale, Network Accountability for the Domestic Intelligence Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1441
(2010); Joshua A. T. Fairfield & Erik Luna, Digital Innocence, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 981 (2014); David
Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62 (2013); Woodrow
Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 35-40 (2013);
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who "upload hundreds of millions of photos and send 500 million tweets
each day, add 300 hours of video to YouTube each minute, and create six
new Facebook profiles each second."5 Nick Rasmussen, Director of the
National Counterterrorism Center, explained: "[T]he work we're doing
now with our partners in the intelligence community often doesn't involve
really, really sensitive intelligence. It involves looking at Twitter and or
looking at some other social media platform and trying to figure out who
that individual behind that screen name, behind that handle might actually
be and whether that person poses a threat.... .
6
The advent of the digital age has brought the advent of Social Media
Intelligence (SOCMINT) and Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) to
accompany other intelligence gathering tools, such as Human Intelligence
(HUMINT) and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT).7 The disclosures of former
National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden in 2013
revealed the extent to which the intelligence community relies upon social
media and internet surveillance,8 and other data surveillance and
cybersurveillance tools.9 PRISM, for example, one of the first revelations,
allowed the NSA and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to retrieve data
from Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Facebook, Skype, YouTube, Apple, and
other companies.10 Much research examining the legal consequences of the
Helen Nissenbaum, Toward an Approach to Privacy in Public: Challenges of Information Technology,
7 ETHICS & BEHAV. 207 (1997); Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in Public, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 141, 142
(2014); Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934 (2013).
5. Handeyside, supra note 3.
6. Can the high-tech hunt for terrorists stop lone wolf attacks?, PBS NEWSHOUR (Sept. 6,2016,
8:15 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/can-high-tech-hunt-terrorists-stop-lone-wolf-attacks
[https://perma.cc/T7Z4-AGXV] (capturing PBS Correspondent Miles O'Brien's Interview with Nick
Rasmussen, Director of the National Counterterrorism Center).
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., JENNIFER GRANICK, AMERICAN SPIES: MODERN SURVEILLANCE, WHY YOU
SHOULD CARE, AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT (2017); GLENN GREENWALD, NO PLACE TO HIDE: EDWARD
SNOWDEN, THE NSA, AND THE U.S. SURVEILLANCE STATE (2014); David E. Pozen, Privacy-Privacy
Tradeoffs, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 221 (2016); Jon L. Mills, The Future of Privacy in the Surveillance Age,
in AFTER SNOWDEN: PRIVACY, SECRECY, AND SECURITY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 191 (Ronald
Goldfarb ed., 2015); Margaret Hu, Taxonomy of the Snowden Disclosures, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1679 (2015) [hereinafter Hu, Taxonomy].
9. See, e.g., Roger A. Clarke, Information Technology and Dataveillance, 31 COMM. ACM 498
(1988). Clarke describes dataveillance as the systematic monitoring or investigation of people's actions,
activities, or communications through the application of information technology. Id. at 499.
10. See, e.g., GREENWALD, supra note 8; Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British
Intelligence Mining Data from Nine U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. POST
(June 7, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-
intemet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/
2 013/06/06/3aOcOda8-cebf- 1le2-8845-d970cc
b04497 story html [https://perma.cc/Y2SF-3DKR] ("The National Security Agency and the FBI are
tapping directly into the central servers of nine leading U.S. Internet companies, extracting audio and
video chats, photographs, e-mails, documents, and connection logs that enable analysts to track foreign
targets, according to a top-secret document obtained by The Washington Post."). See generally LAURA
K. DONOHUE, THE FUTURE OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE: PRIVACY AND SURVEILLANCE IN A DIGITAL
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Snowden revelations has focused on activities that are explicitly recognized
as foreign intelligence gathering and national security surveillance
activities." This Article, however, does not focus on foreign intelligence
gathering or law enforcement data collection that is self-descibed by the
federal government as surveillance. It also does not analyze the
constitutional impact of social media data collection by the U.S. Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) or other federal agencies.12
Instead, this Article focuses its attention on how social media
intelligence-gathering programs conducted by the intelligence community
may be replicated by DHS government record collection and retention
protocols. Specifically, it aims to demonstrate how data surveillance, or
dataveillance, 13 is increasingly bureaucratized in the digital age, often taking
advantage of citizens' trust in day-to-day governance activities, such as the
federal government's public announcement of its records collection and
records maintenance protocols. To illustrate how social media intelligence
objectives can be replicated under federal immigration law and policy, and
AGE (2016); GRANICK, supra note 8; Mills, in AFTER SNOWDEN, supra note 8; Hu, Taxonomy, supra
note 8; Margo Schlanger, Intelligence Legalism and the National Security Agency's Civil Liberties Gap,
6 HARV. NAT'L SEC. J. 112 (2015); Stephen I. Vladeck, Big Data Before and After Snowden, 7 J. NAT'L
SEC. L. & POL'Y 333 (2014).
11. Both preceding and following the revelations of Edward Snowden in June 2013, experts have
offered a rich analysis of the legality of surveillance activities by the intelligence community. See
generally DONOHUE, supra note 10; William C. Banks, Programmatic Surveillance and FISA: Of
Needles in Haystacks, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1633 (2010); Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection:
Statutory and Constitutional Considerations, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 757 (2014); Christopher
Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, Political Process Theory, and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 102 GEO.
L.J. 1721 (2014); Margot E. Kaminski & Shane Witnov, The Conforming Effect: First Amendment
Implications of Surveillance, Beyond Chilling Speech, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 465 (2015); Orin S. Kerr, A
Rule of Lenity for National Security Surveillance Law, 100 VA. L. REV. 1513 (2014); Peter Margulies,
Dynamic Surveillance: Evolving Procedures in Metadata and Foreign Content Collection After
Snowden, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (2014); Paul Ohm, Electronic Surveillance Law and the Intra-Agency
Separation of Powers, 47 U.S.F. L. REV. 269 (2012); Peter P. Swire, Privacy and Information Sharing
in the War on Terrorism, 51 VILL. L. REV. 951 (2006).
12. At the outset, it is critical to admit that a legal analysis of social media surveillance or open
source intelligence gathering that relies on publicly available data is complicated significantly by the
Fourth Amendment's current jurisprudence. Although a Fourth Amendment analysis goes beyond the
scope of this Article, it is important to note that it could be argued that social media data collection by
the government would not appear to fall within the protection of the Fourth Amendment's reasonable
expectation of privacy test under Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967), and the third-party
doctrine. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979); see also United States v. Miller, 425 U.S.
435, 443 (1976). Under a straightforward reading of the third-party doctrine, it could be argued that
information shared through a social media platform would not be considered private. Future scholarship
will address how the recent Supreme Court decision in Carpenter forces a reexamination of the reach
and scope of the Fourth Amendment in light of digital surveillance tools, including social media
surveillance tools. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
13. See, e.g., DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE STUDIES: AN OVERVIEW 16 (2007) ("Being much
cheaper than direct physical or electronic surveillance [dataveillance] enables the watching of more
people or populations, because economic constraints to surveillance are reduced. Dataveillance also
automates surveillance. Classically, government bureaucracies have been most interested in gathering
such data .... ).
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
through the record collection protocols of DHS, this Article focuses on a
"Privacy Act of 1974; System of Records[:] Notice of Modified Privacy Act
System of Records," published in the Federal Register by DHS on
September 18, 2017 (September 2017 DHS Notice). 14 The Notice
announced a modification of a specific system of records maintained by
DHS: "DHS/USCIS [United States Citizenship and Immigration Services]-
ICE [Immigration and Customs Enforcement]-CBP [Customs and Border
Protection]-001 Alien File, Index, and National File Tracking System of
Records. 15
Under the public notice requirements of the Privacy Act of 1974,16 in a
Federal Register Notice published by DHS on September 18, 2017, DHS
notified the public that this DHS record system would be modified to
encompass social media data collection. 7 This social media data collection
program should be understood as representing a bureaucratized evolution of
digital surveillance or cybersurveillance.' 8 Many new efforts to collect and
analyze social media data are not labeled as surveillance or intelligence
gathering programs. Rather, social media surveillance on citizens and
noncitizens alike can occur administratively. As an outgrowth of the
administrative state, they may at times fall outside of the legal restraints'
9
14. Privacy Act of 1974; System of Records, 82 Fed. Reg. 43,556 (Dep't of Homeland Sec. Sept.
18, 2017). The DHS Notice and other notices are interrelated, and expand social media data collection
as part of immigration law and vetting procedures: (1) Privacy Act of 1974; DHS/CBP-024 Intelligence
Records System (CIRS) System of Records, 82 Fed. Reg. 44,198 (Sept. 21, 2017); (2) 60-Day Notice of
Proposed Information Collection: Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration, 83 Fed. Reg.
13,806 (Dep't of State Mar. 30, 2018)); and (3) 60-Day Notice of Proposed Information Collection:
Application for Nonimmigrant Visa, 83 Fed. Reg. 13,807 (Dep't of State Mar. 30, 2018). See also
SOCIAL MEDIA MONITORING REPORT, supra note 1.
15. Privacy Act of 1974, 82 Fed. Reg. at 43,556.
16. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (Supp. V 2017); see also Citron, Government 2.0, supra note 1; Paul M.
Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902 (2009); Kimberly A. Houser and Debra Sanders,
The Use of Big Data Analytics by the IRS: Efficient Solution or the End of Privacy as We Know It?, 19
vAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 817 (2017).
17. See supra note 14, and see infra accompanying discussion in Parts 1I.B and III.A.
18. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0 209 (2006) (describing cybersurveillance
or "digital surveillance" as "the process by which some form of human activity is analyzed by a computer
according to some specified rule .... [T]he critical feature in each [case of surveillance] is that a
computer is sorting data for some follow-up review by some human."). An emerging evolution of U.S.
cyber policy and the changing nature ofcyber offensive or covert cyber activities may increasingly blend
military cyber actions with other cybersurveillance programs. See, e.g., Robert Chesney, New
Authorities for Military Cyber Operations and Surveillance, Including TMA [Traditional Military
Activities]?, LAWFARE (June 27, 2018, 2:46 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/new-authorities-
military-cyber-operations-and-surveillance-including-tma [https://perma.cc/7MLF-XJ3U] (analyzing
cyber provisions of the Senate version of the John McCain National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2019 and noting provision that authorizes Cyber Command "to conduct surveillance
targeting private Russian actors" in specific circumstance and questioning whether such activity should
fall within NSA).
19. See, e.g., Fred H. Cate, Government Data Mining: The Need for a Legal Framework, 43
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435 (2008); Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth
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imposed on the intelligence community by foreign intelligence surveillance
law or the criminal procedure protections of the Fourth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution. Better understanding the routinized administration of
social media surveillance as a screening and vetting procedure under
immigration law, or as a homeland security or national security policy under
DHS programs, can shed light on this emerging phenomenon. 0
In the September 2017 DHS Notice, for instance, DHS explained that
social media data now will be included in the Alien File (A-File).21 The A-
File is an official record of an immigrant applicant's visa and immigration
history.22 Alien registration numbers and related A-Files are created for
Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 317 (2008); Daniel J. Solove, Data Mining and the Security-Liberty
Debate, 75 U. CHLI. L. REV. 343 (2008).
20. Immigration scholars and other experts have increasingly focused their attention on
immigration-related surveillance technologies that have been adopted by DHS. See generally JENNIFER
LYNCH, FROM FINGERPRINTS TO DNA: BIOMETRIC DATA COLLECTION IN U.S. IMMIGRANT
COMMUNITIES AND BEYOND (2012); Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and
Constitutional Abyss: Remote Biometric Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 407 (2012);
Anil Kalhan, Immigration Surveillance, 74 MD. L. REV. 1 (2014); Fatma E. Marouf, Alternatives to
Immigration Detention, 38 CARDOZO L. REv. 2141 (2017); Mark Noferi & Robert Khoulish, The
Immigration Detention Risk Assessment, 29 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 45 (2014). After the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, scholars and experts called for greater scrutiny of immigration-related vetting
procedures and registration systems. See, e.g., Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights,
and Immigration Law After September 11, 2001: The Targeting ofArabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.Y. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 295 (2002); Victor C. Romero, Decoupling Terrorist from Immigrant: An EnhancedRole
for the Federal Courts Post 9/11, 7 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 201 (2003); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Is
Immigration Law National Security Law?, 66 EMORY L.J. 669, 692 nn.142-43 (2017) (citing SHOBA
SIVAPRASAD WADHIA & KAREEM SHORA, NSEERS: THE CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICA'S EFFORTS TO
SECURE ITS BORDERS 9 (2009), https://www.adc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/NSEERS-ADC-
Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/GR8P-P8R4]; RIGHTS WORKING GRP. & CTR. FOR IMMIGRANTS' RIGHTS,
PA. STATE UNIV.'S DICKINSON SCH. OF LAW, THE NSEERS EFFECT: A DECADE OF RACIAL PROFILING,
FEAR, AND SECRECY (2012), https:// pennstatelaw.psu.edu/_file/clinics/NSEERSreport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BE4R-RSSP]). The National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS)
program was officially dismantled during the Obama Administration. See, e.g., Shoba Sivaprasad
Wadhia, Shutting Down Special Registration, MEDIUM (Dec. 11, 2016),
https://link.medium.com/HJQnzkMrI Z [https://perma.cc/ZG5C-FWL5].
21. Privacy Act of 1974; System of Records, 82 Fed. Reg. 43,556 (Dep't of Homeland Sec. Sept.
18, 2017). Alien Files (A-File records) are defined as:
[A] system of records contain[ing] information regarding transactions involving
an individual as he or she passes through the U.S. immigration process, some of
which may also be covered by separate Systems of Records Notices. DHS
primarily maintains information relating to the adjudication of benefits,
investigation of immigration violations, and enforcement actions in Alien Files
(A-Files). Alien Files became the official file for all immigration records created
or consolidated since April 1, 1944. Before A-Files, many individuals had more
than one file with the agency. To streamline immigration recordkeeping, legacy
Immigration and Naturalization Service issued each individual an Alien Number,
allowing the agency to create a single file for each individual containing that
individual's official immigration record. DHS also uses other immigration files
to support administrative, fiscal, and legal needs.
Id.
22. Privacy Act; Alien File (A-File) and Central Index System (CIS) Systems of Records, 72
Fed. Reg. 1,755, 1,756 (Jan. 16, 2007) ("The A-File is the record that contains copies of information
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immigrants and certain categories of non-immigrants who are granted
employment authorization.23 In addition to naturalized citizens and lawful
permanent residents (green card holders), immigrant visa holders, asylees,
and special immigrant juveniles, and student visa holders with optional
practical training also possess A-File records by DHS.24
The September 2017 DHS Notice revealed that social media data can
now be retained in the A-Files for both noncitizens and lawful permanent
residents, as well as naturalized or foreign-born citizens of the United
States. By some estimates, there are approximately forty-three million
foreign-born individuals currently residing in the United States. 25 DHS
retains A-File records after individuals gain naturalized U.S. citizenship.
26
DHS claims that the September 2017 DHS Notice conforms to the
existing protocol. In response to requests to clarify the Notice, DHS stated:
"The notice did not announce a new policy. The notice simply reiterated
existing DHS policy regarding the use of social media. ' '27 Yet, the Notice
indicates that social media screening is emerging as a routinized aspect of
DHS screening and vetting procedures. The Notice also signals how social
media intelligence is increasingly becoming bureaucratized-treated not as
a surveillance practice, but, rather, as a records collection practice.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I offers a brief overview of the
Privacy Act and why experts have raised concerns that social media data
collection promulgated by DHS is inconsistent with the law. Part II provides
a summary of how DHS has engaged in social media monitoring since at
least 2010. It also attempts to contextualize DHS social media surveillance
practices within other algorithmic decisionmaking systems that are
increasingly dependent upon mass data collection, including the gathering
of social media data. Part III focuses on extreme vetting as a case study to
regarding all transactions involving an individual as he/she passes through the U.S. immigration and
inspection process. Previously, legacy Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) handled all of
these transactions. Since the formation of DHS, however, these responsibilities have been divided among




25. See Riana Pfefferkorn, On Social Media, How Can DHS Tell Who's An Immigrant?, STAN.
CTR. INTERNET & SOC'Y BLOG (Sept. 29, 2017, 11:40 PM),
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2017/09/social-media-how-can-dhs-tell-who's-immigrant
[https://perma.cc/RD24-GCM3] (citing Jie Zong, Jeanne Batalova & Jeffrey Hallock, Frequently
Requested Statistics on Immigrants and Immigration in the United States, MIGRATION POLICY
INSTITUTE (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/frequently-requested-statistics-
immigrants-and-immigration-united-states [https://perma.cc/R5VP-EEZW]).
26. See supra note 22.
27. Matt Novak, US Homeland Security Says Tracking Social Media Is Nothing New, GLZMODO
(Sept. 28, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://gizmodo.com/us-homeland-security-says-tracking-social-media-of-
immi- 1818875395 [https://perma.cc/3GB8-X2SE].
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better understand the data analytics-driven screening programs embraced by
contemporary immigration and national security policies. Part IV explains
why the reliance upon the Privacy Act's system of records notice (SORN)
requirements to expand social media data collection undermines trust in
federal administrative action and deserves careful legal attention.
Trust in the Privacy Act is at risk when the Act's required notice
announces social media data collection and analysis systems under the guise
of modifying record collection and retention protocols. This Article
concludes that the social media data collection proposed by DHS requires
express legislative authorization.28 The Privacy Act does not authorize data
collection. A Federal Register Notice announcing a system of records notice
under the Privacy Act does not provide sufficient legal justification for mass
social media data collection. Consequently, widespread and systematized
social media data collection programs, such as the one proposed by DHS in
the September 2017 DHS Notice, or proposed by any federal agency,
require explicit congressional approval.
I. INTRODUCTION TO PRIVACY ACT AND SUMMARY OF CONCERNS RAISED
BY THE DHS NOTICE: "PRIVACY ACT OF 1974; SYSTEM OF RECORDS"
(SEPTEMBER 18,2017)
Part I sets the factual and legal predicate for how one example of modern
use of the Privacy Act of 1974 can be viewed as ironic. Part L.A provides an
overview of the legislative background to the Privacy Act covering the (1)
legislative history and (2) purpose and statutory requirements imposed on
federal agencies. Part I.B summarizes the concerns of commenters-
responding to modifications to the DHS/USCIS-ICE-CBP-001 Alien File,
Index, and National File Tracking System of Records published by DHS in
the Federal Register on September 18, 2017-involving the (1)
constitutional impact, (2) Privacy Act and administrative law issues, and (3)
apprehension regarding data collection, storage, and use stemming from the
September 2017 DHS Notice.29
28. See SOCIAL MEDIA MONITORING REPORT, supra note 1, at 5.
29. Privacy Act of 1974; System of Records, 82 Fed. Reg. 43,556 (Dep't of Homeland Sec. Sept.
18, 2017).
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A. Introduction to the Privacy Act of 1974
1. Legislative History and Amendment to the Privacy Act
Upon passage of the Privacy Act of 1974, the intention of the Act was
made clear in a legislative statement entered by Congress: "Congress must
act before sophisticated new systems of information gathering and retention
are developed, and before they produce widespread abuses. The peculiarity
of new complex technologies is that once they go into operation, it is too
late to correct mistakes or supply our oversight. ' 30 Therefore, the Act aimed
to "promote accountability, responsibility ... [and prevent] illegal, unwise,
overbroad, investigation and record surveillance of law-abiding
citizens[.],, 31 To achieve this goal, Congress expressed its intent to "prevent
the secret gathering of information on people or the creation of secret
information systems or data banks on Americans by employees of the
departments and agencies of the executive branch[,]" and to provide a
method for publicly disclosing what confidential information was being
stored on citizens and how that information would be used.32
The legislative history emphasizes the need to preserve citizens' privacy
rights in light of digitized encroachments and includes this foresightful
statement on the urgency for increased privacy protections under the law:
"One of the most obvious threats the computer poses to privacy comes in
its ability to collect, store, and disseminate information . . .Yet the
increasing growth of information-gathering by Government and private
organizations proceeds without any standards or procedures to regulate
these organizations. ' 33 Senator Birch Bayh (D-Ind.) explained that the
purpose of the Privacy Act was to help define the "basic right of every
citizen to a sphere of privacy," to help the citizenry embrace the notion that
a democratic society requires "freedom from unwarranted intrusion."
34
Congress stated the purpose of the Act was to "promote governmental
respect for the privacy of citizens by requiring all departments and agencies
of the executive branch and their employees to observe certain
30. 120 CONG. REC. 12,646 (May 1, 1974) (remarks of Sen. Ervin (D-N.C.) on S. 3418).
31. Protecting Individual Privacy in Federal Gathering, Use and Disclosure of Information, S.
REP. No. 93-1183, REPORT OF THE U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT RELATIONS TO
ACCOMPANY S. 3418 To ESTABLISH A PRIVACY PROTECTION COMMISSION, TO PROVIDE MANAGEMENT
SYSTEMS IN FEDERAL AGENCIES AND CERTAIN OTHER ORGANIZATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE
GATHERING AND DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION CONCERNING INDIVIDUALS, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES 1 (1974) [hereinafter S. REP. No. 93-1183].
32. Id. at 2 3.
33. 120 CONG. REC. 12,647 (May 1, 1974) (remarks of Sen. Ervin (D-N.C.) on S. 3418).
34. Federal Data Banks, Computers, and the Bill of Rights: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, Part I, 92nd Cong. 303 (1971) (statement by Sen.
Bayh (D-Ind.), Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
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constitutional rules in the computerization, collection, management, use,
and disclosure of personal information about individuals. 35 The Act, thus,
recognized the need to "put specific limits on those who would gather and
use this information."
36
In 1988, the Privacy Act was amended to incorporate the Computer
Matching and Privacy Protection Act (CMPPA).3 7 The CMPPA prohibits
computer matching of federally held data unless such matching is justified
pursuant to statutory or executive directive authorities and is "relevant and
necessary to accomplish" governmental objectives relating to the legal
authority.38 Specifically, the CMPPA applies to: federal engagement of
computerized matching systems and electronic records comparisons,
matching of categories of subjects and persons, the administration of a
federal benefit program, and an intent to engage in a computerized matching
activity.39 The CMPPA is intended to complement the privacy goals of the
Privacy Act, including the integrity of data use disclosure of data used by
the federal government through computerized matching. 40
2. Purpose of the Privacy Act and Statutory Requirements Imposed on
Federal Agencies
The Privacy Act of 1974 was enacted to govern the collection,
maintenance, use, and dissemination of personally identifiable information
about individuals that is maintained in "systems of records" by federal
agencies.4 1 A system of records is defined as "any records under the control
of a federal agency from which information is retrieved by the name of the
individual or by some ... [identifier] ... assigned to the individual. 42 The
federal law prohibits the disclosure of information from a system of records
absent the written consent of the subject individual, unless the disclosure is
35. S. REP.NO. 93-1183, supranote31,at l.
36. Federal Data Banks, Computers, and the Bill of Rights: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, Part I, 92nd Cong. 303, 304 (1971) (statement by
Sen. Bayh (D-Ind.), Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
37. 5 U.S.C. § 552a, Pub. L. No. 100-503 (1988).
38. § 552a(e)(1) (requiring that each federal agency must "maintain in its records only such
information about an individual as relevant and necessary to accomplish a purpose of the agency required
to be accomplished by statute or by executive order of the President.").
39. Id.
40. See Houser & Sanders, supra note 16, at 860-61 nn.316-20 (citing, inter alia, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Overview of the Privacy Act of 1974, in DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE COMMENTARY § 3-17.000 3
(2015); U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-44, COMPUTER MATCHING ACT: OMB AND
SELECTED AGENCIES NEED TO ENSURE CONSISTENT IMPLEMENTATION 13 (2014); Privacy Act of 1974:
Final Guidance Interpreting the Provisions of Public Law 100-503, The Computer Matching and Privacy
Protection Act of 1988, 54 Fed. Reg. 25,818 (Office of Mgmt. and Budget June 19, 1989)).
41. See, e.g., § 552a(a)(5) (defining "system of records"); see also supra note 31.
42. § 552a(a)(5).
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allowed under specified statutory exceptions.43
Passage of the Privacy Act was hastened by the Watergate
investigation, and concerns by members of Congress that increasingly
sophisticated methods of computerized database storage and querying
could be abused. Specifically, "Congress was concerned with curbing
the illegal surveillance and investigation of individuals by federal
agencies that had been exposed during the Watergate scandal." '44 The
Privacy Act was designed to "provide[] certain safeguards for an individual
against an invasion of personal privacy" by the federal agencies.45 In order
to accomplish data privacy protections, especially in database management
and the searching of databases by government officials, the Privacy Act
enacted methods for handling an individual's confidential records and
provided a civil remedies provision to authorize civil lawsuits against the
federal government for Privacy Act violations.46
The Act generally provides the right of access to federal agency records
where the person is a subject of those records.47 That right to access one's
records is judicially enforceable unless a federal agency is able to claim an
exemption to the Privacy Act. The multiple exemptions available to federal
agencies under the Privacy Act to prevent an individual's right of access to
federal agency records will be discussed in more detail in Part IV.
Unlike exemptions, conditions of disclosure to third parties under the
Privacy Act describe certain conditions that must be present for federal
agencies to legally disclose information compiled on an individual to
others48-micluding other federal agencies, contractors, and other private
individuals. 49 To the extent that federal records are protected in part or in
full from disclosure, a federal agency must claim that the records fall within
one of the enumerated conditions of disclosure articulated by the Privacy
Act. These conditions include, for example: statistical purposes by U.S.
43. § 552a(b)(1)-(12); see also infra note 255.
44. OFFICE OF PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OVERVIEW OF THE
PRIVACY ACT 4 (2010), https://www.justice.gov/opcl/file/6397 3 1/download [https://perma.cc/BH4R-
BW5J] (quoted in FAA v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441, 1462 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)).
45. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (1974) (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. § 552a).
46. § 552a(g)(1)(D), (g)(4)(A).
47. See § 552a.
48. See § 552a(b)(l)-(l 2); see also infra note 255.
49. See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974; System of Records, 82 Fed. Reg. 43,556, 43,561 (Dep't of
Homeland Sec. Sept. 18, 2017) (announcing "information contained in this system may be disclosed
outside DHS as a routine use pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(b)(3)" to "F. To contractors and their agents,
grantees, experts, consultants, and others performing or working on a contract, service, grant,
cooperative agreement, or other assignment for DHS, when necessary to accomplish an agency
function related to this system of records.").
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Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics; 50 routinized use within a
U.S. government agency;5' record archival purposes "as a record which has
sufficient historical or other value to warrant its continued preservation by
the United States Government",;52 civil or criminal law enforcement
purposes; 53  congressional investigations; 54  and to achieve other
administrative objectives.55
Federal agencies must state "the authority (whether granted by statute,
or by Executive order of the President) which authorizes the solicitation of
the information and whether disclosure of such information is mandatory or
voluntary" when requesting information.56 Importantly, the Privacy Act
does not apply to all records of any given individual or citizen, but, rather,
only applies to records held by a federal agency.57
Under the requirements of the Privacy Act, when a federal agency
modifies its system of records, the agency must publish a notice in the
Federal Register that describes the revision. 58 For instance, this Federal
Register Notice must include: "each routine use of the records contained in
the system, including the categories of users and the purpose of such use. 59
The Privacy Act provides that at least a thirty-day notice must be provided
in the Federal Register of "any new use or intended use of the information
in the system," along with an "opportunity for interested persons to submit
written data, views, or arguments to the agency. '60 The September 2017
DHS Notice published in the Federal Register regarding the "Modified
Privacy Act System of Records" 6 'by DHS to include the collection of social
media data, therefore, fell within these mandatory reporting requirements
under the Privacy Act that dictated the publication of the change in











60. § 552a(e)(I 1).
61. Privacy Act of 1974; System of Records, 82 Fed. Reg. 43,556 (Dep't of Homeland Sec. Sept.
18, 2017) ("ACTION: Notice of Modified Privacy Act System of Records.").
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B. A Brief Overview of Selected Comments to DHS Notice "Privacy Act of
1974; System of Records" (September 18, 2017)
The September 2017 DHS Notice was highly controversial and resulted
in over 2,900 comments submitted to DHS by the public. 62 Pursuant to the
requirements of the Privacy Act that mandate disclosure of a federal
agency's proposed revision to its system of records or establishment of a
new system containing information on individuals, 63 DHS published the
Notice to describe the collection and use of social media data. 64 DHS
explained that the social media data would be used for the purposes of
assessing and adjudicating immigration benefits, and for immigration
investigations and enforcement. 65 DHS also indicated that other uses of the
social media data would include investigatory purposes including criminal
law enforcement and counterterrorism goals.66
1. Constitutional Law Concerns
The use of the Privacy Act's mandate to give public notice of a revision
of DHS system records67 to include social media data collection raises
multiple legal concerns. These concerns include potential constitutional
infringements, including the potential violation of First and Fourth
Amendment rights. A close analysis of the constitutional impact of social
media surveillance extends beyond the scope of this Article. It is important
to note, however, that many commenters responding to the September 2017
DHS Notice raise concerns that are intersectional in nature. Several
commenters note that social media surveillance combines constitutional
concerns with technological capacity issues, such as whether the social
62. See DHS/USCIS-001 Alien File, Index, and National File Tracking System of Records,
Docket ID: DHS-2017-0038, REGULATIONS.GOV (Sept. 18, 2017),
https://www.regulations.gov/docketBrowser?rpp=25&po=0&dct=PS&D=DHS-2017-
0038&refD=DHS-2017-0038-0001 [https://perma.cc/V7LD-5VQR]; see also VICTORIA NEILSON,
CHAIR, COMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION & NATIONALITY LAW, NEW YORK CITY BAR, COMMENT ON
NOTICE OF MODIFIED PRIVACY ACT SYSTEM OF RECORDS 3 (Oct. 20, 2017),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/documents.nycbar.org/files/
2 017282Comments on System of RecordsN
otice IMNAT 10.18.17.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TMP-RD8U] (noting over 2,400 comments were
submitted by October 11,2017).
63. § 552a(e)(4) ("subject to the provisions of paragraph (11) of this subsection, publish in the
Federal Register upon establishment or revision a notice of the existence and character of the system of
records[.]").
64. Privacy Act of 1974, 82 Fed. Reg. at 43,556.
65. Id. at 43,556- 57.
66. Id. at 43,557 -63.
67. See § 552a(e)(4).
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media data collected and analyzed can accurately serve the objectives
articulated by DHS.68
Comments generated by the public and submitted to DHS in response to
the Federal Register Notice include First Amendment concerns with chilling
of speech and expressive freedoms, and infringing upon association rights.69
Other First Amendment concerns include whether requests for social media
handles and aliases could potentially jeopardize anonymous speech, and
whether analysis of social media data may result in political and religious
targeting. v
A coalition letter that included twenty-seven organizations-such as the
ACLU, Brennan Center for Justice, Center for Democracy & Technology,
the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), and Human Rights Watch-and
other expert responses, express concern regarding the warrantless seizure of
data and mass cyber searches of social media information in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. 71 A comment letter sent to DHS by the Electronic
Privacy Information Center (EPIC) further shares the coalition's concern
regarding the accuracy and integrity of the social media data collected.72
Some commenters also note that the meaning of messages conveyed over
social media might be difficult to interpret and discern.73 Multiple
comments express concern that naturalized U.S. citizens will be relegated
to "second-class citizenship," as under the Notice the social media data may
be retained on both immigrants and naturalized U.S. citizens.74
68. See, e.g., Coalition Letter Opposing DHS Social Media Retention, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY
AND TECHNOLOGY (Oct. 19, 2017), https://cdt.org/insight/coalition-lette r-opposing-dhs-social-media-
retention/ [https://perma.cc/LK7C-22VJ] [hereinafter Coalition Letter]; Rotenberg & Scott, infra note
69, at 5.
69. See Comment submitted by Marc Rotenberg, Jeramie Scott, and the Electronic Privacy
Information Center (EPIC) (Oct. 18, 2017), https://epic.org/apa/comments/EPIC-DHS-Social-Media-
Info-Collection.pdf [https://perma.cc/P93D-FE3L] [hereinafter Rotenberg & Scott].
70. See Coalition Letter, supra note 68.
71. See, e.g., Levinson-Waldman, supra note 1; Natasha Duarte, Congress is Writing a Privacy
Law. It Must Address Civil Rights, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY (May 7, 2019)
https://cdt.orgiblog/congress-is-writing-a-privacy-law-it-must-address-civil-rights/
[https://perma.cc/2R5C-PT6U]; Cope & Schwartz, infra note 92; Coalition Letter, supra note 68;
Rotenberg & Scott, supra note 69, at 8; Sellars, infra note 164; Patel & Panduranga, infra note 193.
72. Rotenberg & Scott, supra note 69, at 5-9; see also SOCIAL MEDIA MONITORING REPORT,
supra note 1, at 5.
73. See, e.g., Coalition Letter, supra note 68; Rotenberg & Scott, supra note 69; see also SOCIAL
MEDIA MONITORING REPORT, supra note 1, at 4-5.
74. See, e.g., Coalition Letter, supra note 68; NEILSON, supra note 62.
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2. Privacy Act and Administrative Law Concerns
Multiple commenters note that the September 2017 DHS Notice appears
to go beyond a simple modification of a "system of records." The
Immigration and Nationality Law Committee of the New York City Bar, for
instance, observes in its comment that the DHS Notice issued sweeping
changes to the categories of persons covered by the system to include, for
example, "associates" who may include immigration attorneys and other
counsel.7 5 The New York City Bar further notes that the modification of
records did not appear to be a modification at all, but, rather, appeared to be
a new form of system information that may require congressional
authorization.7 6 The New York City Bar voices administrative procedure
concerns with the Notice, and whether the Privacy Act has been honored in
spirit, even though it may have been honored under the letter of the law.
77
3. Data Collection, Storage, and Use Concerns
Civil rights organizations and others raise a particular concern about the
vagueness of the September 2017 DHS Notice. The Notice, for instance,
failed to define "social media" or "search results. '78 The Notice also failed
to limit retention of the social media data, thus allowing for the default: 100
years for the storage of the social media data held within the DHS A-Files.
79
The coalition notes that the failure to explain with any specificity how
exactly the social media data would be used, currently and into the future,
raises a concern regarding how such data might invite discrimination and
data abuse, negative inferences, and may chill expressive and associational
freedoms.8
Multiple comments reflect deep reservations about the new social media
75. NEILSON, supra note 62, at 4.
76. Id. at 2-5.
77. See id. at 3.
78. Coalition Letter, supra note 68.
79. Id.
80. Id. Important research has been published on the potential harms of predictive analytics, and
the inferential harms that may flow from big data scoring/risk assessment systems and algorithmic
decisionmaking. See, e.g., PASQUALE, supra note 4; Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data's
Disparate Impact, 104 CAL. L. REV 671 (2016); Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored
Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2014); Kate Crawford &
Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms,
55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 122 (2014); Deven R. Desai, Constitutional Limits on Surveillance: Associational
Freedom in the Age of Data Hoarding, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579 (2014); Jennifer C. Daskal, Pre-
Crime Restraints: The Explosion of Targeted, Noncustodial Prevention, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 327,328-
30 (2014); Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1260 (2007).
Other scholars have focused critical research on the relationship between data production and social
media data, and protection of expressive freedoms. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech is a Triangle,
118 CoLUM. L. REV. 2011 (2018); Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech, 66 STAN. L. REV. 56 (2014).
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data collection activities by the federal government in light of unanswered
questions. These questions include: whether or not the social media
collection was indeed a storage of records or whether the social media
information would be collected for the purposes of new intelligence
products; 81 how the storage of the data in the A-Files for up to one-hundred
years could impact future use in automated decision making and algorithmic
risk assessment;12 and whether such social media surveillance might
increase the risk of data misuse and abuse without evidence of the benefits
to national security.83 Some commenters suggest adding the ability to
correct, access, and even destroy data collected in order to prevent power
imbalances, and to better ensure fairness and accuracy for important data-
driven decisions.84 Finally, several commenters express a concern that the
new social media collection protocols may effectively relegate naturalized
U.S. citizens to second-class citizenship status,85 not only as a matter that
may implicate constitutional law, as mentioned above, but also as a matter
of data retention and use. These commenters point out that questions remain
regarding whether social media surveillance would continue and for how
long after an individual might become a naturalized U.S. citizen. 86
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF SOCIAL MEDIA INTELLIGENCE GATHERING BY DHS
To better understand how DHS uses social media data to serve broader
intelligence objectives beyond immigration screening and vetting, Part II
provides the following historical background: (A) the initial attempts by
DHS to utilize social media data; (B) history of how DHS integrated social
media data collection into an official federal agency policy; and (C) context
for why social media intelligence by the intelligence community is
considered legally and programmatically distinct from social media data
collection by DHS for its records system. Yet, as will be explored in more
detail in Parts III and IV, this Article invites further discussion on how this
distinction may be obscuring the true privacy law impact of social media
data collection.
A. DHS Social Media Monitoring Pilot Programs
The federal government publicly declared that it would capture social
media technologies not for express surveillance purposes, but, rather, in the
81. See Coalition Letter, supra note 68, at 5.
82. See id. at 6.
83. See id.
84. See Duarte, supra note 71.
85. See NEILSON, supra note 62, at 4; Coalition Letter, supra note 68.
86. See Coalition Letter, supra note 68.
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service of executive branch engagement with the public shortly after the
election of President Barack Obama. In January 2009, Obama initiated a
"Transparency and Open Government" initiative.8 7 Also referred to as
"Government 2.0," the initiative mandated the adoption of social media
technology by federal agencies, in part, in order to "put information about
[governmental] operations and decisions online ....8 Privacy scholars
such as Danielle Keats Citron observed that an increased use of social media
by the executive branch ushered in the promise of many potential beneficial
uses, including: "to broadcast updates on pressing matters[,] to post research
data... [and] to facilitate discussions between agencies and citizen-experts
on policy matters and will surely entice people who might otherwise not
engage with government to join those discussions.'9 At the same, Citron
predicted that the federal government's use of social media would introduce
a host of unprecedented privacy concerns. 90 With a broader engagement of
social media data, the federal government would likely use social media
surveillance. Citron observed that "[n]othing prevents agencies from
collecting, analyzing, and distributing individuals' social-media data for
law enforcement, immigration, benefits determinations, and other [national
security and non-national security] purposes."91
Citron's warning proved prescient. On a pilot program basis, DHS
officially commenced its experimentation with social media surveillance as
early as 2010.92 In 2010, through social media monitoring, DHS "targeted
public reactions to the earthquake in Haiti, the Winter Olympics in
Vancouver and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. '93 DHS was particularly
interested in harnessing social media monitoring to enhance its "situational
87. Transparency and Open Government: Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments
and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,685 (Jan. 21, 2009).
88. Id.
89. See Citron, Government 2.0, supra note 1, at 825 (internal citations omitted).
90. Id. at 826.
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., Sophia Cope & Adam Schwartz, DHS Should Stop the Social Media Surveillance
of Immigrants, EFF: DEEPLINKS BLOG (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/10/dhs-
should-stop-social-media-surveillance-immigrants [https://perma.cc/V6WQ-3K3U]. The Brennan
Center for Justice's timeline of social media screening activities related to DHS vetting also provides an
excellent resource to better understand the historical development of social media surveillance by DHS.
ICE Extreme Vetting Initiative: A Resource Page, Chronology of Social Media Monitoring: Timeline of
Social Media Monitoring for Vetting by DHS and the State Department, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Sept.
9, 2019), https ://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/timeline-social-media-monitoring-vetting-
department-homeland-security-and-state-department [https://perma.cc/AP27-GD83].
93. G.W. Schulz, Homeland Security Office OKs Efforts to Monitor Threats Via Social Media,
REVEALNEWS (Nov. 15, 2012), https://www.revealnews.org/article/homeland-security-office-oks-
efforts-to-monitor-threats-via-social-media/ [https://perma.cc/8LPV-VNMT].
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awareness capacities." 94 Situational awareness 95 is defined by the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 as: "[I]nformation gathered from a variety of sources
that, when communicated to emergency managers and decision makers, can
form the basis for incident management decisionmaking. 96
Also, in 2010, the EFF obtained documents through the Freedom of
Information Act that revealed DHS officials in the Office of U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services were instructed on how to "friend"
immigrants on Facebook in order to monitor social media details on their
background. 97 Other DHS social media monitoring programs appeared to
focus on forecasting homeland security threats. As a result of a Freedom of
Information Act request for information by EPIC in 2012, it was revealed
that DHS monitored the use of "keywords and phrases" on various social
media sites in order to detect "signs of terrorist or other threats against the
U.S. '98 As part of its social media monitoring initiative, DHS's National
Operations Center signed up for a Twitter profile
(twitter.com/DHSNOCMMC 1) with the handle @DHSNOCMMC 1.
Other agencies also announced initiatives designed to monitor or analyze
social media in order to forecast national security risks. In 2012, for
example, the U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA), announced an initiative titled: "Forecasting
Dynamic Group Behavior in Social Media." 99 DARPA solicited an
automated tool that analyzed social media data to predict terrorism. It
explained that: "Many online communities enable the creation of virtual
teams, which evolve over time. Among these communities and teams are
terrorist and other criminal organizations."' 00 In order to "forecast[]
dynamic group behavior in social media[,]" DARPA explained that it
94. Id.; see also OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., USING
SOCIAL MEDIA FOR ENHANCED SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND DECISION SUPPORT (2014),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Using / 20Social / 20Media /%20for%/o20Enhanced
%20Situational%2OAwareness%20and%20Decision%20Support.pdf [https://perma.cc/ET3T-ZGLU]
[hereinafter USING SOCIAL MEDIA].
95. See USING SOCIAL MEDIA, supra note 94.
96. Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. § 321d(a) (2006).
97. Jennifer Lynch, Applying for Citizenship? U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Wants to Be
Your 'Friend,' EFF (Oct. 12, 2010), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/10/applying-citizenship-u-s-
citizenship-and [https://perma.cc/2648-FR6Y].
98. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL OPERATIONS CENTER MEDIA MONITORING
CAPABILITY DESKTOP REFERENCE BINDER (2011), https://epic.org/foia/epic-v-dhs-media-
monitoring/Analyst-Desktop-Binder-REDACTED.pdf [https://perma.cc/WSA2-SSRK].
99. DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY, 12.B SMALL BUSINESS TECHNOLOGY
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envisioned tools that had the capacity to scan over one million people, over
1,000 groups, and over 100,000 postings per day.'
0
'
In 2012, the FBI released a Request for Information, soliciting
information on the development of a tool that would assist the agency in
using social media and internet surveillance through web scraping and
analysis of other open-source data. The FBI explained: "The application
must have the ability to rapidly assemble critical open source information
and intelligence that will allow [the FBI's Strategic Information and
Operations Center] to quickly vet, identify and geo-locate" potential
threats.10 2 The FBI further requested the ability to automatically search and
scrape data off social media and news sites based on agent's queries, and
the ability to display alerts on geo-spatial maps in order to isolate threats.
10 3
Media reports indicate that the FBI has continued to acquire and pursue the
acquisition of large-scale social media monitoring tools.' 
04
B. DHS Social Media Monitoring as Official Policy: DHS Directive 110-01
DHS officially launched its social media monitoring policy on June 8,
2012, through the publication of DHS Directive 110-01: "Privacy Policy for
Operational Use of Social Media" (Directive). 10 5 DHS provided the
following legal authorities for the Directive:
A. Public Law 107-347, "E-Government Act of 2002," as
amended, Section 208 [44 U.S.C. § 3501 note][;]
B. Title 5, United States Code (U.S.C.), Section 552a,
"Records Maintained on Individuals" [The Privacy Act of
101. Id.
102. STRATEGIC INFO. & OPERATIONS CTR., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, REQUEST FOR
INFORMATION (RFI) (Jan. 19, 2012), https://www.fbo.gov/index?s5opportunity&mode
-- f
on&tab -core
&id-c65777356334dab8685984fa74bfd636&_cview-l [https://perma.cc/4JTD-JCEE] (follow "RFI"
hyperlink).
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., Jeff Horwitz & Dustin Volz, FBI Surveillance Proposal Sets Up Clash with
Facebook: Agency Solicits Vendor Proposals to Collect Data from Facebook, Other Social Media to
Head OffSafety Threats, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 8, 2019, 8:15 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/fbi-and-
facebook-potentially-at-odds-over-social-media-monitoring- 11565277021 [https://perma.cc/XEW4-
6XU3]; Joseph Cox, SocioSpyder: The Tool Bought by the FBI to Monitor Social Media, VICE (Feb.
23, 2016, 9:55 AM), https://www.vice.com/en us/article/8q8g73/sociospyder-the-tool-bought-by-the-




105. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS DIRECTIVE 110-01, PRIVACY POLICY FOR OPERATIONAL
USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA (June 8, 2012), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/foia/I 10-01-001 PrivacyP
olicy for Operational Use of Social Media.pdf[https://perma.cc/G5GV-UZBQ].
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1974, as amended][;]
C. Title 6 U.S.C. Section 142, "Privacy officer"[;]
D. Title 44, U.S.C., Chapter 35, Subchapter III,
"Information Security" [The Federal Information Security
Management Act of 2002, as amended (FISMA)][;]
E. Delegation 13001, "Delegation to the Chief Privacy
Officer[.]"' 10 6
The Directive explains that each DHS component head has the discretion
to determine how to deploy social media monitoring tools and that
"[c]omponent heads work with the [DHS] Chief Privacy Officer to ensure
that Department operational activities using social media follow DHS
privacy policy and procedures, thereby enhancing the overall consistency of
privacy protections across DHS."'0 7 In a six-month period in 2012, over
9,300 "item-of-interest" reports were generated by the DHS social media
monitoring program. 108
From the adoption of the Directive under the Obama Administration in
June 2012 until the commencement of the Trump Administration in January
2017, DHS engaged in the adoption of multiple social media screening
tools. In February 2017, the DHS Office of Inspector General issued a report
titled, DHS' Pilots for Social Media Screening Need Increased Rigor to
Ensure Scalability and Long-term Success.10 9 The report revealed that in
December 2015, for instance, DHS adopted a social media screening tool
that facilitated both manual and automatic screening of unspecified
individuals submitting applications to DHS in order to "examine the
feasibility" of the tool." 0 The report explained that DHS utilized a "social
media analytics tool" that "covers a large number of social media platforms,
has access to third-party information providers, and can access web-based
information.""' By April 2016, DHS began testing an additional social
106. Id. at 1-2.
107. Id. at 2.
108. Emily Stanton, Department of Homeland Security Uses Twitter for Monitoring Citizens, US
NEWS BLOG (July 18, 2013, 12:43 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/washington-
whispers/2013/07/18/department-of-homeland-security-uses-twitter-for-monitoring-citizens
[https://perma.cc/T379-SQMT].
109. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, OIG-17-40, DHS' PILOTS FOR
SOCIAL MEDIA SCREENING NEED INCREASED RIGOR TO ENSURE SCALABILITY AND LONG-TERM
SUCCESS (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2017/OIG- 17-40-Febl 7.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QTA8-H5AF] [hereinafter DHS' PILOTS FOR SOCIAL MEDIA SCREENING].
110. Id. at 2.
111. Id. at 2, n.6.
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media screening tool that was developed by DARPA in order to screen
nonimmigrant visa holders.'
12
On June 23, 2016, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) within DHS
issued a Federal Register notice titled, "Agency Information Collection
Activities: Arrival and Departure Record (Forms 1-94 and 1-94W) and
Electronic System for Travel Authorization." '1 3 Under the Federal Register
notice, issued under the Paperwork Reduction Act, CBP proposed the
collection of social media data of travelers arriving through the Visa Waiver
Program as part of the Arrival and Departure Record, Nonimmigrant Visa
Waiver Arrival/Departure, and Electronic System for Travel Authorization
(ESTA), including adding optional data fields on the DHS Form 1-94 and
DHS Form 1-94W.1 14 Independently, in August 2016, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) within DHS began the pilot testing of a social
media screening tool to screen nonimmigrant visa holders that was intended
to complement background "checks conducted in conjunction with the
Department of State and help identify potential derogatory information not
found in Government databases."
'1 15
The report noted that pilot tests of social media screenings by DHS up
until that point had "lack[ed] criteria for measuring performance to ensure
they meet their objectives. 1 16 Without further evidence and testing
information, the report concluded that the tests "provide limited information
for planning and implementing an effective, department-wide future social
media screening program."
'1 17
C. SOCMJNT: Social Media Intelligence and Algorithmic Decision-making
The intelligence community (IC) is comprised of sixteen IC components
that are coordinated under the umbrella of the White House Office of the
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). 8 The IC includes the National
Security Agency (NSA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and FBI.11 9
DHS includes one office, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, that
provides DHS with intelligence information and coordinates intelligence
activities with the other IC components, as well as "fusion centers" that are
112. Id. at2-3.
113 Agency Information Collection Activities: Arrival and Departure Record (Forms 1-94 and 1-
94W) and Electronic System for Travel Authorization, 81 Fed. Reg. 40,892 (Customs and Border Prot.
June 23, 2016).
114. Id.
115. DHS' PILOTS FOR SOCIAL MEDIA SCREENING, supra note 109, at 3-4.
116. Id. at 1.
117. Id.
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tasked with the collection and analysis of "threat-related information
between federal; state, local, tribal, territorial (SLTT); and private sector
partners. 1 20 Because other non-IC components of DHS have been tasked
with the collection of social media data, the collection of social media data
by non-IC components may not be formally identified as "Social
Intelligence" or SOCINT per se. Consequently, some refer to the collection
as social media tracking or social media monitoring, as the collection and
use of DHS social media data is not fully known or understood. Further,
some experts would contend that the social media data collection is not
appropriately characterized as "intelligence." 21
As DHS Directive 110-01 allows each component to establish its own
policies and programs regarding the operational use of social media,1 22 it is
instructive to examine how one component, CBP, appears to be utilizing
social media data in its intelligence gathering operations. On September 21,
2017, CBP announced a modification of the "System of Records" under the
Privacy Act of 1974. The newly created CBP Intelligence Records System
(CIRS) is intended to aggregate immigration, law enforcement, national
security, and publicly available data, such as social media data, to generate
CBP intelligence reports by the CBP Office of Intelligence (OI).123 The
CIRS will deploy algorithmic decision-making and predictive tools,
including the "Analytical Framework for Intelligence (AFI)" and
"Intelligence Reporting System (IRS).' 24 The systems apparently will rely
upon complex algorithms to assess identity, social and organizational
relationships, and automated threat-risk assessments.
The CIRS will focus on identifying "commonalities" that allow the CBP
Intelligence Office to develop "a DHS-generated intelligence product that
may lead to further investigation or other appropriate follow-up action by
CBP, DHS, or other federal, state, or local agencies."'' 25 The report will also
heavily focus on analysis of associational data.126 The Notice explains that
the analysis will rely upon biographic, biometric, criminal and investigatory
records, and other government documents. 127 By specifying that the data
120. Fusion Centers, DHS, https://www.dhs.gov/fusion-centers [https://perma.cc/8QPE-C85R];
see also, e.g., Citron and Pasquale, supra note 4.
121. See, e.g., Coalition Letter, supra note 68; Rotenberg & Scott, supra note 69 (experts
submitting comments in response to the DHS's Notice of Modification of System of Records, Privacy
Act of 1974; System of Records, 82 Fed. Reg. 43,556 (Sept. 18, 2017), use the terms "social media
screening" and "social media collection" and do not use the term "social media intelligence").
122. See Coalition Letter, supra note 68; Rotenberg & Scott, supra note 69.
123. Privacy Act of 1974; DHS/CBP-024 Intelligence Records System (CIRS) System of Records,
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analyzed will also include publicly available information, the CIRS will
allow for the inclusion of social media analysis.
The Notice explains that the scope of those who can be targeted for an
investigation includes those who may be "associated" with border security
or CBP law enforcement goals. 128 Targets for investigation can also include
individuals who possess "a potential nexus to national security, CBP's law
enforcement responsibilities, or homeland security in general[.] 129 This
suggests the system can collect data from citizens and noncitizens. The
underlying data and intelligence reports generated by the system can be
shared with other law enforcement and intelligence agencies. 130 Finally, it
appears that the system can inform A-File records and, therefore, can be
used to guide analytics for algorithmic decision-making systems developed
by other DHS components. In response to the CIRS proposal, EPIC
submitted a comment to the DHS criticizing the system for the security
threat created by compiling the data into a centralized database, the broad




The algorithmic decisionmaking tools acquired by DHS externally
through private contractors and internally through DHS integrated database
systems are dependent upon massive volumes of data. Social media data is
seen as a critical component of the success of these tools. One way to better
understand this is to look carefully at the extreme vetting proposal that
stemmed from what was referred to as the "Muslim ban" or the "travel ban."
In Part III, the discussion will (A) provide a brief history of how social
media data collection is considered one of the data backbones of what has
been referred to as the "extreme vetting" of immigrants; (B) describe the
predecessor tools that "extreme vetting" is built upon; and (C) explain how
social media monitoring is reflected in the Visa Lifecycle Vetting Initiative,
an incarnation of "extreme vetting" that appears to combine manual vetting
with automated vetting systems.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. "Consistent with DHS's information sharing mission, information stored in the DHS/CBP-
024 CIRS System of Records may be shared with other DHS Components . . . [and] DHS/CBP may
share information with appropriate federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, foreign, or international
government agencies consistent with the routine uses[.]" Id. at 44,199.
131. Comment Submitted to DHS by Electronic Privacy Information Center responding to 82 Fed.
Reg. 44,198, "Privacy Act of 1974; DHS/CBP-024 Intelligence Records System (CIRS) System of
Records," (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.epic.org/apa/comments/EPIC-CBP-Intelligence-Records-
System-Comments.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DCL-4LB4].
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A. Muslim Ban and Social Media Screening of Immigrants
On December 7, 2015, then-presidential candidate Donald J. Trump
published a "Statement on Preventing Muslim Immigration" on his
campaign website.' 32 Trump explained that he was "calling for a total and
complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our
country's representatives can figure out what . . . is going on." 33 The
campaign later explained that the temporary ban on entry would permit the
government to execute an assessment of immigration procedures, and
"suspend immigration from regions linked with terrorism .... 5,134 Shortly
before his election, Trump also announced a proposal for the "extreme
vetting" of immigrants and refugees. 135 Trump clarified that "[t]he Muslim
ban is something that in some form has morphed into a[n] extreme vetting
[protocol] from certain areas of the world."'' 36
One week after his inauguration, President Trump signed Executive
Order 13,769, on January 27, 2017, titled "Protecting the Nation from
Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States,"' 137 the first of several
documents referred to as the "travel ban" or the "Muslim ban." The first
travel ban incorporated multiple screening requirements that mandated the
132. See Megan Trimble, Trump 'Muslim Ban' Post Now Missing From Campaign Website, US
NEWS (May 9, 2017, 11:29 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/2017-05-
09 /trump-muslim-ban-post-missing-from-campaign-website-after-reporter-question
[https://perma.cc/E24G-U8XG]; Gerhard Peters & John T. Wooley, Presidential Debate at Washington
University in St. Louis, Missouri, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Oct. 9, 2016),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edulws/index.php?pid= 119038 [https://perma.cc/A79V-TLVW]; see also
Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, National Security, Immigration and the Muslim Bans, 75 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1475, 1478-80 (2018) (contending that "backdoor bans" that restrict immigration on the basis of
nationality can be constructed through "administrative processing"); Peter Margulies, Bans, Borders,
and Justice." Judicial Review of Immigration Law in the Trump Administration, 2018 MICH. ST. L. REV.
1, 35-48 (2018) (arguing for a more searching judicial review of "extreme vetting" and the need to
recognize the significant long-term impact of "extreme vetting").
133. Peters & Wooley, supra note 132.
134. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 25, 2016, 7:37 PM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/746895065591783424?Iang=en [https://perma.cc/H3AL-
F4HX].
135. See Margaret Hu, Algorithmic Jim Crow, 86 FORD. L. REV 633, 635 (2017) [hereinafter Hu,
Algorithmic Jim Crow]; Margaret Hu, Crimmigration-Counterterrorism, 2017 WISC. L. REV 955, 962
(2017) [hereinafter Hu, Crimmigration-Counterterrorism]. On August 15, 2016, then candidate Trump
announced at a campaign rally that if elected President he would implement what he referred to as
"extreme vetting" of refugees and immigrants for national security purposes. See Jeremy Diamond,
Trump Proposes Values Test for Would-Be Immigrants in Fiery ISIS Speech, CNN POLITICS (Aug. 15,
2016, 9:39 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2016/08/14/politics/donald-trump-isis-fightlindex.html
[https://perma.cc/ZD4K-HLZV]. Then-candidate Trump explained: "The time is long overdue to
develop a new screening test for the threats we face today. I call it extreme vetting. I call it extreme,
extreme vetting." Id.
136. Peters & Wooley, supra note 132.
137. Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Feb. 1, 2017).
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implementation of extreme vetting. 138 Then-Secretary of DHS John Kelly
testified at a hearing before the U.S. House Homeland Security Committee
on February 7, 2017, that extreme vetting would include seeking the social
media passwords in order to screen social media activity and other types of
screening, such as web browsing history.1 39 On March 6, 2017, in response
to litigation surrounding the first travel ban, President Trump issued a
revised Executive Order under the same title as the first travel ban,
Executive Order 13,780, which left the extreme vetting provisions of the
first travel ban in place and appeared to expand several vetting protocols.
140
As a method of implementing extreme vetting, the U.S. Department of
State modified its information collection protocols of visa applicants. On
May 4, 2017, the U.S. Department of State issued a Federal Register Notice
under the Paperwork Reduction Act, titled, "Notice of Information
Collection Under OMB Emergency Review: Supplemental Question for
Visa Applicants.' 14 ' The supplemental request for information from a
"subset" of visa applicants included social media handles, aliases, phone
numbers, and email addresses over the past five years. 142 The notice
purported to request the information as a way to "more rigorously evaluate
applicants for terrorism or other national security-related visa
ineligibilities[.]"' 143 As an emergency action, the notice observed that it
would only be in effect for 180 days. 144 On May 18, 2017, a coalition of
thirty-five civil and human rights organizations-including the Brennan
Center for Justice, Center for Democracy and Technology, EFF, Human
Rights Watch, National Immigration Law Center, and others-filed a
comment with the U.S. Department of State, expressing concerns that this
modification of the protocol, including the collection of social media
information, would raise significant constitutional and human rights
138. See, e.g., Hu, Algorithmic Jim Crow, supra note 135, at 638-43; Hu, Crimmigration-
Counterterrorism, supra note 135, at 984-92.
139. Ending the Crisis: America's Borders and the Path to Security: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Homeland Sec., 115th Cong. 83 (Feb. 7, 2017),
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HMO0/
2 0170207/105474/HHRG- 115-HM00-Transcript-
20170207.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WAG-WSNU] (statement of John F. Kelly, DHS Secretary). As ofthe
time of publication, the proposal to seek social media passwords have not been officially adopted as a
part of official vetting protocol.
140. See, e.g., Hu, Algorithmic Jim Crow, supra note 135, at 638-43; Hu, Crimmigration-
Counterterrorism, supra note 135, at 984- 92.
141. Notice of Information Collection Under OMB Emergency Review: Supplemental Question
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concerns. 145 Less than three months later, the State Department issued an
additional notice proposing to make the revised collection protocol
permanent. 
146
Exactly how DHS intended to use an automated tool for social media
vetting gained clarity with media revelations surrounding a DHS "Industry
Day," hosted on July 18-19, 2017, to discuss a request for information on
an industry contract to build technologies for extreme vetting. During this
event, DHS circulated a document entitled: "Extreme Vetting Initiative., 147
This document explained that DHS intended to award contracts to the firms
to assist the federal government in counterterrorism-related data analysis. 1 4 8
Specifically, through a competitive selection process, contractors would be
awarded DHS contracts to fund the collection and analysis of all publicly
available social media and online data that is not password protected:
The contractor shall analyze and apply techniques to
exploit publically [sic] available information, such as
media, blogs, public hearings, conferences, academic
websites, social media websites such as Twitter, Facebook,
and LinkedIn, radio, television, press, geospatial sources,
internet sites, and specialized publications with intent to
extract pertinent information regarding targets, including
criminals, fugitives, nonimmigrant violators, and targeted
national security threats and their []location. 149
The "Extreme Vetting Initiative" document asserted that the agency's
present capacity to predict a would-be immigrant's potential criminality or
terroristic threat level is insufficient as it is "fragmented across mission
areas and [is] both time-consuming and manually labor-intensive due to
complexities in the current U.S. immigration system. ' 150
145. Comment by Coalition of Civil and Human Rights Organizations in Response to 82 Fed.
Reg. 20,956 (May 4, 2017) Notice of Information Collection Under OMB Emergency Review:
Supplemental Question for Visa Applicants (May 18, 2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/
default/files/State%/ 20Dept%/ 20lnformation / 20Collection / 20Comments / 20-%2051817_3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8J9C-TB78].
146. 60-Day Notice of Proposed Information Collection: Supplemental Question for Visa
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ICE stated that it sought a computer-based system that will act as an
"overarching vetting" tool "that automates, centralizes, and streamlines the
current manual vetting process while simultaneously making
determinations via automation if the data retrieved is actionable" in an effort
to "implement the President [Donald Trump]'s various Executive Orders
(EOs) that address American immigration and border protection security
and interests." '5 ' According to ICE, the ideal system would have the ability
to "determine and evaluate an applicant's probability of becoming a
positively contributing member of society, as well as their ability to
contribute to national interests" and to determine "whether an applicant
intends to commit criminal or terrorist acts after entering the United
States.' 15
2
In a follow-up Q&A session with the attendees, DHS conceded that its
"biggest constraint, because we are a vetting/screening operation, is that we
are required to work with what is publically [sic] available., 153 DHS
received a question from an anonymous contractor regarding a potential
legal challenge by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). 154 The
anonymous question asked:
Five years ago the FBI tried to accomplish the objectives
that are being stated here and the ACLU shut it down. The
FBI tried to [do] this type of contract in the past and the
ACLU shut them down. Does [DHS] realize the [legal and
constitutional] problems of the past and what happened
before?'55
DHS responded that although the FBI had been frustrated in the past while
trying to develop a comparable datamining system concentrated on U.S.
citizens, the fact that the proposed program would focus on noncitizens and
would collect the data on U.S. citizens not on purpose, but incidentally or
tangentially, makes it less likely to face such legal hurdles. 156 One official
stated: "The prediction is that in the near future there will be legislation
151. Sam Biddle & Spencer Woodman, These Are The Technology Firms Lining Up To Build
Trump's "Extreme Vetting" Program (Aug. 7, 2017, 12:45 PM),
https://theintercept.com/2017/08/07/these-are-the-technology-firms-lining-up-to-build-trumpsextreme-
vetting-program/ [https://perma.cc/R2PG-FNM9] (quoting the ICE "Extreme Vetting Initiative"
document).
152. Id. (quoting the ICE "Extreme Vetting Initiative" document).
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addressing what you can and can't do.... We will continue to do it until
someone says that we can't."'' 57
Shortly thereafter, on September 18, 2017, the DHS Privacy Office
introduced a notice under the title of "Notice of Modified Privacy Act
System of Records."' 58 In the September 2017 DHS Notice, DHS explained
that information now would be added to the A-Files 159 of immigrants,
including amending its record retention practices to require immigrants to
disclose social media accounts. DHS stated that it will now collect
information including "social media handles, aliases, associated identifiable
information, and search results"'160 on immigrants. This change allows DHS
to collect data gathered from Tweets, Facebook posts, Instagram uploads,
and other social media search results.
DHS elaborated that the amended practice reflected a policy of
"conducting more immigration actions in an electronic environment" that
would "[r]edefme which records constitute the official record of an
individual's immigration history.' 16' This redefinition specifically includes
immigrants, lawful permanent residents, and naturalized U.S. citizens'
"social media handles, aliases, associated identifiable information, and
search results."' 62 DHS did not define "search results."
As discussed in Part I, the September 2017 DHS Notice was
controversial and generated almost 3,000 comments. Experts note that U.S.
citizens who communicate with immigrants would be impacted by the
modification to the DHS record system. 63 Other public comments received
by DHS question the scientific validity and efficacy of the social media
screenings, noting that DHS has not offered any evidence that social media
screening thwarts terrorist or criminal risks. 16 4 Additionally, six U.S.
157. Id.
158. Privacy Act of 1974; System of Records, 82 Fed. Reg. 43,556 (Dep't of Homeland Sec. Sept.
18, 2017). DHS had previously announced a policy on social media data collection on June 8, 2012. See
supra note 105 and accompanying discussion in Part II.B. Therefore, it is unclear whether social media
data collection was included in the A-File prior to the publication of the "Notice of Modified Privacy
Act System of Records" on September 18, 2017.
159. See supra note 21.
160. Privacy Act of 1974, 82 Fed. Reg. at 43,556.
161. Id.
162. Id. at43,557.
163. See, e.g., Coalition Letter, supra note 68. See generally Comment submitted by Juvaria Khan,
Muslim Advocates (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.muslimadvocates.org/files/MA-Comment-to-DHS-
FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/WF7W-GSDJ]; Comments submitted by Marc Rotenberg, Jeramie Scott,
Christine Bannan, and the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) (Oct. 24, 2017),
https://epic.org/EPIC-DOS-Visas-SocialMediaID-Dec2O17.pdf [https://perma.cc/52R9-6R68];
Comments submitted by Marc Rotenberg, Jeramie Scott, Spencer Beall, and the Electronic Privacy
Information Center (EPIC) (Sept. 27, 2018), https://epic.org/apa/comments/EPIC-Comments-DOS-
Social-Meida-IDs-Sept2O18.pdf [https://perma.cc/3VTF-8FU2].
164. See, e.g., Coalition Letter, supra note 68; Comment submitted by Andrew Sellars, BU/MIT
Technology & Cyberlaw Clinic, BU School of Law (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.regulations.gov/doc
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Senators submitted a letter to Acting DHS Secretary, Elaine Duke, posing
fifteen questions, seeking additional information on program
implementation, and articulating constitutional and privacy concerns. 1
65
DHS, in defense of the legality and legitimacy of the September 2017
DHS Notice and the collection of social media data, explained:
This policy permits . . . USCIS[United States Citizenship
and Immigration Services] officers to access publicly
available social media as an aid in determining whether an
individual is eligible for an immigration benefit. The notice
does not authorize USCIS to search the Internet history of
these individuals. Furthermore, the notice does not
authorize USCIS to search the social media accounts of
naturalized citizens; rather, it simply restates USCIS'
authority to search publicly available social media
information of individuals applying for naturalization and
informs the public that this publicly available information
will be stored in the applicant's alien file.
66
On September 24, 2017, President Trump published his third travel ban,
a Presidential Proclamation titled "Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and
Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by
Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats."'167 The Proclamation emphasized
the need for increased screening and vetting processes, including the
collection of biometric and biographic data.' 68 The Proclamation followed
DHS's September 18, 2017, Federal Register publication of the "Notice of
Modified Privacy Act System of Records,"' 69 and the CBP's September 21,
2017, "Notice of new Privacy Act System of Records." 70 In October 2017,
DHS issued a press release announcing new investigative procedures for
refugees from eleven "high-risk" countries that included social media
ument?D=DHS-2017-0038-2960 [https://perma.cc/CCN5-9FGB] [hereinafter Sellars] (discussing
overbroad nature of the Notice; concerns about using social media data in a discriminatory manner;
effectiveness of social media data collection (e.g., wasting time on fruitless searches, whether terrorists
will use hidden accounts, and accuracy of algorithms)); see also DHS' PILOTS FOR SOCIAL MEDIA
SCREENING, supra note 109; SOCIAL MEDIA MONITORING REPORT, supra note 1, at 6- 7.
165. Sens. Bob Menendez (D-N.J.), Ed Markey (D-Mass.), Patty Murray (D-Wash.), Cory Booker
(D-N.J.), Kristen Gillibrand (D-N.Y.), Mazie Hirono (D-Haw.), Letter to Elaine Duke, Acting DHS
Secretary (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.menendez.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/DHS Social-media-
immigration-screening-menendez.pdf [https://perma.cc/8EYJ-DYTB].
166. Novak, supra note 27.
167. Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 27, 2017).
168. Id. at45,170.
169. Privacy Act of 1974; System of Records, 82 Fed. Reg. 43,556 (Dep't of Homeland Sec. Sept.
18, 2017).
170. Privacy Act of 1974; DHS/CBP-024 Intelligence Records System (CIRS) System of Records,
82 Fed. Reg. 44,198 (Sept. 21, 2017).
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checks and an additional ninety-day review period. 17 ' The enhanced vetting
procedures were issued in accordance with Section 6(a) of the second travel
ban, Executive Order 13,780.72 These changes were implemented in
January 2018.173
On March 3 0, 2018, the Department of State published two notices in the
Federal Register that appear to build upon the social media intelligence
gathering efforts: a "Notice of Proposed Information Collection:
Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration,"'' 74 and a "Notice
of Proposed Information Collection: Application for Nonimmigrant
Visa.' ' 175 The State Department, Consular Office, in its oversight of the visa
application process and in coordination with DHS, has increasingly
requested social media account information from visa applicants.
Individuals from certain states176 or who have visited terrorist-controlled
areas 177 are required to provide the State Department with all phone number,
email, and social media account history for the past five years.178 Vetting
procedures set forth by the State Department as described in the notices have
taken effect and include database screening through multiple intelligence
agencies, U.S. Department of Defense, and other law enforcement databases
171. Press Release: Improved Security Procedures for Refugees Entering the United States, DHS
(Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/10/24/improved-security-procedures-refugees-
entering-united-states [https://perma.cc/TPN2-9TQ3].
172. Id.
173. Laura Koran & Tal Kopan, US Increases Vetting and Resumes Processing of Refugees from
'High-Risk' Countries, CNN POLITICS (Jan. 29, 2018, 5:55 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/29/
politics/us-refugee-vetting-measures/index.html [https://perma.cc/DPC7-QJCG].
174. 60-Day Notice of Proposed Information Collection: Application for Immigrant Visa and
Alien Registration, 83 Fed. Reg. 13,806 (Dep't of State Mar. 30, 2018).
175. Id. at 13,807.
176. See Yeganeh Torbati, Mica Rosenberg & Arshad Mohammed, Exclusive: U.S. Embassies
Ordered to Identify Population Groups for Tougher Visa Screening, REUTERS (March 23, 2017, 5:06
AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usaimmigration-visas-exclusive/exclusive-u-s-embassies-
ordered-to-identify-population-groups-for-tougher-visascreening-idUSKBN 16U 12X
[https://perma.cc/6KB8-RVSV]. But see, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., CITIZENSHIP LIKELY AN
UNRELIABLE INDICATOR OF TERRORIST THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES (Feb. 24, 2017),
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3474730/DHS-intelligence-document-on-President-
Donald.pdf [https://perma.cc/6MJ6-3VM5] (draft report obtained by Associated Press); Vivian Salama,
AP Exclusive: DHS Report Disputes Threat from Banned Nations, AP (Feb. 24, 2017),
https://apnews.com/39fl f8e4ceed4a30a4570f693291 c866 [https://perma.cc/9A4L-BST7].
177. Applicants are asked to provide these details if the officer believes they have "been in an area
while the area was under the operational control of a terrorist organization." 60-Day Notice of Proposed
Information Collection: Supplemental Questions for Visa Applicants, 82 Fed. Reg. 36,180, 36,181 (Aug.
3, 2017). As the ACLU has pointed out, however, there is no information on how an officer will
determine that it "appears" that the applicant was in a region which was under the operational control of
a terrorist organization while the applicant was there. American Civil Liberties Union, Comment Letter
on Notice of Information Collection under OMB Review 3 (May 18, 2017),
https://www.aclu.org/other/aclu-commentsupplemental-questions-visa-applicants
[https://perma.cc/5TZ9-PLT6].
178. 82 Fed. Reg. at 36,181.
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at the federal and state level. 1
79
DHS explains that vetting uses both classified and unclassified databases
for biometric and biographic screening, providing corroboration that vetting
involves intelligence tools. 80  For example, "refugees' names and
biographical information [are checked] against CIA databases[,]"' 81 and
multiple other databases' 82 to automatically screen "cellphone numbers,
address books, social media postings, arrest reports and intelligence
assessments[.]"' 83 DHS specifies that vetting of refugees includes "[a]
biometric record check of [the U.S.] Department of Defense (DOD)
holdings collected in areas where DOD has or has had a significant military
presence."
1 84
B. Extreme Vetting Initiative and Visa Lifecyle Vetting Initiative
The Extreme Vetting Initiative appears to build upon the "ICE
Investigative Case Management" system (ICM). 185 It is reported that ICM,
supported by data analytics company Palantir Technologies through a $41
million contract by DHS, allows for up to "10,000 users" to access up to
"tens of millions of subject records."' 86 Through multiple databases, both
public and private, ICM "can provide ICE agents access to information on
179. Id.; see, e.g., Sandra E. Garcia, U.S. Requiring Social Media Information from Visa
Applicants, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/02/us/us-visa-application-
social-media.html [https://perma.cc/H3LX-UE65]; Faiza Patel, Stop Collecting Immigrants' Social
Media, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/30/opinion/immigrants-social-
media.html.
180. DEP'T HOMELAND SEC., U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., REFUGEE SECURITY
SCREENING FACT SHEET 6 (Aug 28, 2018), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Refugee%
2
C%20Asylum%2C%20and%2Olnt%271%200ps[Refugee ScreeningandVettingFact Sheet.pdf [htt
ps://perma.cc/A4PR-NK5X] [hereinafter DHS REFUGEE SECURITY SCREENING FACT SHEET] ("CBP's
[DHS Customs and Border Protection] National Targeting Center-Passenger conducts biographic vetting
of all ABIS biometric matches (both derogatory and benign) against various classified and unclassified
U.S. government databases.").
181. Del Quentin Wilber & Brian Bennett, Federal Agents Are Reinvestigating Syrian Refugees
in U.S. Who May Have Slipped Through Vetting Lapse, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 25,2017, 9:55 AM), https://ww
w.latimes.com/politics/la-na-syria-refugees-vetting-gap-
2 0 170125-story.html [https://perma. cc/33FU-
BGSX].
182. Id. (databases include those of DHS, Department of State, CIA, FBI, and National
Counterterrorism Center, and Department of Defense).
183. Id.
184. DHS REFUGEE SECURITY SCREENING FACT SHEET, supra note 180, at 6 ("DOD screening
began in 2007 for Iraqi applicants and incrementally expanded to all refugee nationalities by 2013.").
185. See Spencer Woodman, Palantir Provides the Engine for Donald Trump's Deportation
Machine, INTERCEPT (Mar. 2, 2017, 12:18 PM), https://theintercept.com/2017/03/02/palantir-provides-
the-engine-for-donald-trumps-deportation-machine/ [https://perma.cc/ESQ4-LARN] (DHS granted
Palantir a $41 million contract in 2014 to build ICM, a "vast 'ecosystem' of data" to assist ICE agents
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a subject's schooling, family relationships, employment information, phone
records, immigration history, foreign exchange program status, personal
connections, biometric traits, criminal records, and home and work
addresses."' 187 ICM is reported to be reliant upon two intelligence data
systems: ICE's FALCON and the CBP's Analytical Framework for
Intelligence (AFI). 188 FALCON, a data mining and data analytic network,
allows DHS Office of Homeland Security Investigations agents to track
immigrants and conduct data analysis on cross-border crimes.' 8 9 ICM also
grants its users access to AFI, a largely classified database.' 90 Experts have
speculated that the risk assessment profiling algorithms associated with
"extreme vetting" are intended to be built upon the algorithms of AFI.' 9'
"'When Trump uses the term 'extreme vetting[,]' AFI is the black-box
system of profiling algorithms that he's talking about. This is what extreme
vetting means. 92
DHS announced that the "Extreme Vetting" Initiative had been renamed
the "Visa Lifecycle Vetting Initiative."'' 93 On February 6, 2018, the White
House released "Presidential Memorandum on Optimizing the Use of
Federal Government Information in Support of the National Vetting
Enterprise."' 94 The Memorandum announced the creation of a National
Vetting Center to coordinate the use of intelligence and other information
among all executive departments and agencies that will be run by the
"Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of National Intelligence, and
187. Id.
188. Id. (citing OFFICE OF THE CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER, REPLAN 04152014, ICE TECS




190. Id.; see also U.S. DEP'T HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT UPDATE FOR THE
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK INTELLIGENCE (AFI) DHS/CBP/PIA-010(a) (Sept. 1, 2016, appendix
updated Mar. 2019), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-cbp-010-a-afi-
2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/LF2H-GRDA] [hereinafter DHS PIA AFI]; infra Part IV.B. 1 (citing AFI Use
in DHS Notice, Titled, Privacy Act of 1974; DHS/CBP-024 Intelligence Records System (CIRS) System
of Records, 82 Fed. Reg. 44,198 (Sept. 21, 2017)).
191. Woodman, supra note 185.
192. Id (quoting Edward Hasbrouck, Identity Project).
193. See, e.g., Faiza Patel and Harsha Panduranga, DHS' Constant Vetting Initiative: A Muslim-
Ban by Algorithm, JUSTSECURITY (Mar. 12, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/53671/dhs-constant-
vetting-initiative-muslim-ban-algorithm/ [https://perma.cc/H49Y-AWFL]; see also Chinmayi Sharma,
The National Vetting Enterprise: Artificial Intelligence and Immigration Enforcement, LAWFARE (Jan.
8, 2019), https://www.lawfareblog.com/national-vetting-enterprise-artificial-intelligence-and-immigrat
ion-enforcement [https://perma.c c/G78S-WUHS].
194. Memorandum on Optimizing the Use of Federal Government Information in Support of the
National Vetting Enterprise, 2018 DAILY CoMP. PRES. DOC. 79 (Feb. 6, 2018),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-201800078/pdf/DCPD-201800078.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LL8W-JYZ3].
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the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency[j.]" '1 95 The memo seeks
"contextual information" in addition to "biographic" and "biometric"
information.'
96
By May 2018, ICE spokeswoman Carissa Cutrell explained that the Visa
Lifecycle Vetting Initiative program had "'shifted from a technology-based
contract to a labor contract."'1 97 In other words, this DHS statement is
intended to suggest that ICE is moving away from an algorithmic-based
technology where the data analysis is automated and has, instead, made the
decision to move to a human-based "labor contract" to analyze 
the data.1 98
Cutrell explained that ICE's Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation
Unit receives "1.2 million 'investigative leads' per year" and prioritizes how
to address the investigative lead through an assessment of threat.'99 Yet,
DHS had previously announced that it was pursuing an automated,
algorithmic-based tool to assist in assessing risk because it was "believed
an automated system would provide a more effective way to continuously
monitor the 10,000 people determined to be the greatest potential risk to
national security and public safety.,
200
Cutrell explained that, through the Visa Lifecycle Vetting Initiative, ICE
sought continuous monitoring of social media behavior to detect "radical or
extremist views."2 0 ' ICE's Acting Director, Thomas Homan, explained that
enhanced analytical tools utilized social media data.20 2 Homan stated that
senior analysts reviewed the leads generated from these tools before the
leads were used in investigations.20 3
"Contract-request documents in June 2017 said the automated system
should contribute to its agents' work and 'generate a minimum of 10,000
investigative leads annually.' 20 4 Under revisions to the Visa Lifecycle
Vetting Initiative contract, DHS explained that, rather than seek a quota of
10,000 investigative leads annually, it would request that the contractor be
required to employ "180 people to monitor the social-media posts of those
10,000 foreign visitors whom ICE flagged as high-risk, generating new
195. Id. at 2.
196. Id. at 1.
197. Drew Harwell & Nick Miroff, ICE Just Abandoned its Dream of 'Extreme Vetting'Software
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leads as they keep tabs on their social-media use." 20 5
On June 4, 2018, DHS issued a Request for Quotation (RFQ) through the
General Services Administration (GSA), seeking bids from potential
vendors by July 11, 2018.206 The RFQ explained that the vendors would be
asked to provide operations support services to the Visa Security Program
(VSP) and the Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU)
within DHS's Visa Lifecycle Vetting Initiative.2 °7 After an initial
evaluation, SRA, later named CSRA and then acquired by General
Dynamics, 2° 8 was awarded a contract from DHS for approximately $113
million.20 9 After reviewing bid protests by competing vendors, on April 9,
2019, the General Counsel of the U.S. Government Accountability Office
(GAO) reaffirmed GSA's decision to grant CSRA a five-and-one-half-year
blanket purchase agreement to support the Visa Lifecycle Vetting
Initiative.210 CSRA has reportedly employed approximately one-hundred
human analysts to fulfill this contract.2 1 '
Because DHS social media data collection appears to contribute to
preexisting data intelligence structures, such as the FALCON and AFI
systems described above, it is unclear whether the data analysis will be
human labor-focused, as presented by DHS spokespersons, or algorithmic-
focused, as was previously represented by DHS. For example, shortly after
the DHS RFQ was issued by GSA in June 2018 to secure a vendor for the
Visa Lifecycle Vetting Initiative, DHS secured the services of Giant Oak,
Inc. for "open source/social media data analytics. 21 2 In August 2018, Giant
Oak received contracts to support the DHS Visa Security Program and
CTCEU, 2 13 and in September 2018, it was contracted to support ICE.2 14 It
205. Id.
206. In re ManTech Adv. Sys. Int'l, Inc., No. B-416734 (U.S. Gov. Accountability Office Nov.
27, 2018).
207. Id.
208. General Dynamics Completes Acquisition of CSRA, GENERAL DYNAMICS (Apr. 2, 2018),
https://www.gd.com/en/Articles/2018/04/02/general-dynamics-completes-acquisition-csra
[https://perma.cc/YP8R-KVDQ].
209. In re ManTech Adv. Sys. Int'l, Inc., No. B-416734.
210. See In re Amyx, Inc., No. B-416734.2 (U.S. Gov. Accountability Office Apr. 9, 2019)
("The RFQ contemplated the issuance of a fixed-price BPA to be performed over a 1-year base
period, four 1-year option periods, and one 6-month extension period.") (internal citations omitted).
211. McKenzie Funk, How ICE Picks its Targets in the Surveillance Age, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/02/magazine/ice-surveillance-deportation.html.
212. SOCIAL MEDIA MONITORING REPORT, supra note 1, at 25.
213. Id. at n.353 (citing Open Source/Social Media Data Analytics-VSP: Aug. 21, 2018-Aug. 20,
2019, USA SPENDING, https://www.usaspending.gov/#/award/67807277 [https://perma.cc/EJW9-
MLHR]; Open Source/Social Media Data Analytics-CTCEU June 13, 2018-Aug. 31, 2019, USA
SPENDING, https://www.usaspending.gov/#/award/66685141 [https://perma.cc/WJQ4-JWQ9]).
214. Id. at nn.354-55 (citing Spending by Prime Award: Sept. 4, 2014-Sept. 24, 2018, USA
SPENDING, https://www.usaspending.gov/#/searchJf2b8fSd69d869675351 Oal 72f52d46ad
[https://perma.cc/P8RH-8MTZ]; Open Source/Social Media Data Analytics for CBP: Sept. 24, 2018-
2019] 1301
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is not fully known how data is collected and analyzed by DHS vendors such
as Palantir, CSRA, Great Oak, and others.
The discussion below in Part IV explores how the September 2017 DHS
Notice suggests that the social media data collection can be used to create
new intelligence products through database screening, algorithmic-based
tools and data analytics, and artificial intelligence. It focuses especially on
the integrated data environment of the AFI system. The discussion assists
in better understanding why DHS social media data collection should not be
simply characterized as a record-keeping action under DHS's system of
records that falls within the Privacy Act. But, rather, DHS social media data
collection should be more accurately classified as a surveillance program
that necessitates independent authorization by Congress.
IV. PRIVACY AND TRUST: DISTRUST IN THE PRIVACY ACT
This Part aims to help illuminate the potential legal challenges that
accompany the implementation of social media surveillance programs
through administrative means, such as Federal Register Notices published
pursuant to the Privacy Act, rather than through congressionally approved
data collection and intelligence gathering programs. To help explain this
impact, the discussion below specifically focuses on why the
implementation of reporting requirements under the Privacy Act by DHS
seems ironic. Part A provides a general discussion of the provisions of the
Privacy Act that merit close inspection in the September 2017 DHS Notice.
Without a close inspection of these provisions, it would be impossible to
understand the privacy law impact of the Notice. In Part B, the discussion
specifically focuses on how this Notice is a part of a trajectory of reliance
upon the law enforcement exemptions of the Privacy Act by DHS in other
post-9/1 1 Privacy Act Notices.
A. Examining Methods of Subverting the Privacy Act's Intent: DHS Notice
"Privacy Act of 1974; System of Records" (September 18, 2017)
The Privacy Act requires that federal agencies give the public notice of
"systems of records" and modifications to federal systems of records
through publication in the Federal Register, often referred to as a SORN
(System of Records Notice published in the Federal Register Notice under
Sept. 24, 2019, USA SPENDING, https://www.usaspending.gov/#/award/68790969
[https://perma.cc/6A74-CPH9]; Open Source/Social Media Data Analytics: Sept. 25, 2017-Aug. 31,
2022, USA SPENDING, https:/ www.usaspending.gov/#/award/23831407 [https://perma.cc/YE28-
XPXK]; Statement of Work, ICE Contract #HSCEMD- I4-C-00002 P00007, 31).
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the Privacy Act of 1974),2t5 as discussed above. The September 2017 DHS
Notice conforms to the Act's specific mandate that a federal agency publicly
disclose modifications to its record-keeping practices. The "Background"
discussion of the Notice states that "DHS is updating" the following system
of records held by DHS: "DHS/USCIS [U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services]/ICE [U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement]/CBP [U.S.
Customs and Border Protection]-001 Alien File, Index, and National File
Tracking System of Records., 21 6 In the updating of the A-File system of
records, DHS explained that it would promulgate twelve separate
"substantive changes[j.], 2 17 Some "substantive changes" involve clarifying
215. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(4).
216. Privacy Act of 1974; System of Records, 82 Fed. Reg. 43,556, 43,557 (Dep't of Homeland
Sec. Sept. 18, 2017).
217. Id. at 43,557-58. In the Notice Background, DHS explains that it "is updating" the A-File
system of records to include "substantive changes" in the following twelve instances:
(1) Redefine which records constitute the official record of an individual's
immigration history to include the following materials and formats: (a) The paper
A-File, (b) the electronic A-File, or (c) a combination of paper and electronic
records and supporting documentation;
(2) clarify that data originating from this system of records may be stored in a
classified paper A-File or classified electronic network;
(3) provide updated system locations;
(4) update category of individuals covered by this SORN to include individual
acting as legal guardians or designated representatives in immigration
proceedings involving individuals who are physically or developmentally
disabled or severely mentally impaired (when authorized); Civil Surgeons who
conduct and certify medical examinations for immigration benefits; and law
enforcement officers who certify a benefit requestors cooperation in the
investigation or prosecution of a criminal activity; and interpreters;
(5) expand the categories of records to include country of nationality; country of
residence; the USCIS Online Account Number; social media handles, aliases,
associated identifiable information, and search results; and information regarding
the DOJ Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) and BIA proceedings;
(6) add and describe the purpose of the USCIS ELIS, EDMS, and Microfilm
Digitization Application System (MiDAS);
(7) expand data elements used to retrieve records;
(8) update the parameters for retention and disposal of paper A-Files and
electronic A-Files;
(9) include the MiDAS retention schedule;
(10) change system manager to Associate Director, Immigration Records and
Identity Services (IRIS);
(11) update record source categories to include publicly available information
obtained from the internet, public records, public institutions, interviews,
commercial data providers, and information shared obtained through information
sharing agreements; and
(12) update routine use E to comply with Office of Management and Budget
Circular A- 108.
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data storage and where the system is located.218 Other "substantive changes"
raise potential constitutional and legal issues. 219 As a result of the
"substantive changes," the September 2017 DHS Notice impacted the
system of records--"DHS/USCIS/ICE/CBP001 Alien File, Index, and
National File Tracking System of Records"-in the following ways: (1) the
types and sources of data collected, and the categories of individuals whose
data is collected; (2) the conditions of disclosure, including the
characterization of the "routine uses" '220 of the system of records; and (3) the
exemptions claimed under the Privacy Act.221 Each one of these will be
discussed below. The purpose of this description is to help examine how
what DHS has presented as an update to the system of records in fact
subverts the intent of the Privacy Act.
1. Sources and Types of Information Collected, and Categories of
Individuals
a. Categories of Records and Sources of Information
One of the "substantive changes" in the September 2017 DHS Notice is
an "expan[sion of] the categories of records., 222 The Privacy Act states that
when there is a "revision" of a system of records, the notice shall include
the "categories of records maintained in the system. '223 Under the Privacy
Act, the required notice to a revision of a system of records must also
include the "categories of sources" for the system. 224 The September 2017
DHS Notice explains that DHS collects data from multiple sources:
Basic information contained in DHS records is supplied by
individuals on Department of State (DOS) and DHS
applications and forms. Other information comes from
publicly available information obtained from the Internet,
public records, public institutions, interviewees,
commercial data aggregators, inquiries or complaints from
members of the general public and members of Congress,
referrals of inquiries or complaints directed to the President
or Secretary of Homeland Security, information shared
218. Id. at 43,557 (referring to "substantive changes" in the instances of(2) (data storage) and (3)
(system location)).
219. See supra notes 67-74; see infra Conclusion.
220. See § 552a(a)(7) ("The term 'routine use' means, with respect to the disclosure of a record,
the use of such record for a purpose which is compatible with the purpose for which it was collected").
221. Privacy Act of 1974, 82 Fed. Reg. at 43,556.
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through information sharing agreements, reports of
investigations, sworn statements, correspondence, official
reports, memoranda, and written referrals from other
entities, including federal, state, and local governments,
various courts and regulatory agencies, foreign government
agencies, and international organizations. 225
The Notice updates the list of sources DHS is allowed to gather personal
information from to include: "publicly available information obtained from
the internet, public records, public institutions, interviews, commercial data
providers, and information shared or obtained through information sharing
agreement. ' '226 It is unclear how these sources will be used or what the
impact will be.
As discussed above, the Notice broadens the categories of information
collected to include "social media handles, aliases, associated identifiable
information, and search results. 227 However, as one commenter points out
"'social media' is not defined, and could be broadly interpreted to include
any online platform or site that enables users to publicly post content,
communicate with each other, or communicate with the operator or host., 228
This ambiguity makes it impossible to fully understand the impact of the
changes proposed in the Notice.
Multiple commenters have expressed concern that the deployment of
algorithmic decisionmaking by DHS changes the nature of the system of
records. 229 In fact, it is an open question whether the new volume of data
reflected by the collection of social media data can be correctly
characterized as a "modification" of a system of records. The Notice does
not answer whether the social media data will be reconfigured into new
intelligence products or new forms of knowledge, for example, through
predictive analytics and artificial intelligence.23 ° In a separate DHS Federal
Register Notice, published on September 21, 2017, titled, "Privacy Act of
1974; DHS/CBP-024 Intelligence Records System (CIRS) System of
Records," DHS explains that commonalities in data patterns can form the
foundation for new intelligence products: "These commonalities can also
form the basis for a DHS-generated intelligence product that may lead to
further investigation or other appropriate follow-up action by CBP, DHS,
225. Privacy Act of 1974, 82 Fed. Reg. at 43,561.
226. Id. at 43,558.
227. Id. at 43,557.
228. Coalition Letter, supra note 68.
229. See Sharma, supra note 193; Patel & Panduranga, supra note 193; Coalition Letter, supra
note 68; Duarte, supra note 71; Rotenberg & Scott, supra note 69; Sellars, supra note 164.
230. See Biddle & Woodman, supra note 151; Woodman, supra note 185 (quoting Edward
Hasbrouck, Identity Project, explaining that, "AFI is the black-box system of profiling algorithms[.]").
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or other federal, state, or local agencies. 231
In a Privacy Impact Assessment published by DHS on September 1,
2016, DHS provides important information on the integrated data
intelligence structure for the Analytical Framework for Intelligence (AFI)
system.232 AFI provides insight into why social media data is considered
critical to DHS intelligence operations: "AFI permits certain AFI users to
upload and store information that may be relevant from other sources, such
as the Internet (including social media) or traditional news media, into
projects or final intelligence products., 233
The AFI system operates efficiently by using data from multiple systems
of records.2 34 DHS explains that, "AFI is specifically designed to make the
intelligence research and analysis process more efficient by allowing
searches of a broad range of data through a single interface. AFI can also
identify links (relationships) between individuals or entities based on
commonalities, such as identification numbers, addresses, or other
information.,
235
Through the publication of a March 2019 update to the AFI Privacy
23623Impact Assessment, DHS provided two appendices: Appendix A,237
"Approved AFI External Users (non-CBP Users)," and Appendix B,238 "List
of relevant Systems and SORNS, where applicable, for data available
through AFL." In Appendix A, DHS explains that although AFI was
originally developed to support border security by CBP, the use "has
expanded to allow access" to other DHS intelligence programs.2 3 9 In
Appendix B, DHS states CBP-related data in AFI's associated system of
records and other system interfaces includes twenty-six additional
231. Privacy Act of 1974; DHS/CBP-024 Intelligence Records System (CIRS) System of Records,
82 Fed. Reg. 44,198, 44,199 (Sept. 21, 2017) ("These commonalities in and of themselves are not
suspicious, but in the context of additional information they sometimes help DHS agents and analysts to
identify potentially criminal activity and identify other suspicious activities.").
232. DHS PIA AFI, supra note 190.
233. Id. at 4; see also id. at n.19 ("See DHS/CPB-017 Analytical Framework for Intelligence
System, June 7, 2012, 77 FR 13813, which 'permits analysts to upload and store any information from
any source including public and commercial sources, which may be relevant to projects, responses to
RFIs, or final intelligence products."').
234. Seeid. at 1.
235. Privacy Act of 1974, 82 Fed. Reg. at 44,199.
236. DHS PIA AFI, supra note 190 (announcing March 2019 update on DHS website).
237. Id. at 20-22.
238. Id. at 23-29.
239. Id. at 20- 22. (Non-CBP users of AFI now include USCIS: Fraud Detection and National
Security Directorate (FDNS); ICE: Homeland Security Investigations Office of Intelligence;
Transportation Security Administration (TSA): Office of Intelligence and Analysis; U.S. Coast Guard
(USCG): Office of Intelligence; DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis; USCIS: Background Check
Units (BCUs) and Security Vetting and Program Integrity Branch (SVPI); DHS Office of the Chief
Security Officer (OCSO); U.S. Secret Service: Global Investigative Operations Center.).
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systems. 240 Appendix B further elaborates that the "AFI and CIRS" (CPB
Intelligence Records System) system of records include an additional fifteen
systems and databases that are ICE-affiliated; 24 1 five systems and databases
that are USCIS-affiliated; 242 one system that is TSA-affiliated; 243 one
system that is Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA); 244
and ten other systems that are inclusive of other governmental or
commercial data.245
AFI and social media data collection that facilitates automated database
matching to identify individuals appear to implicate the justification for the
240. Id. at 23-25 (CBP-related data in AFI's associated system of records and other system
interfaces include: Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS); Intelligence Reporting System
(IRS-NG); Centers of Excellence and Expertise (CEE) import data; Currency or Monetary Instrument
Reports (CMIR); Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA); Electronic Export Information; I
94-Arrival and Departure Records; TECS [formerly known as the Treasury Enforcement
Communications System] 1004 Land Border Secondary; TECS 1025 Airport Secondary; IECS IOIL
Incident Log; TECS Primary Crossing Person (Primary Query); IECS Primary Crossing Vehicle; TECS
Business Subject Records; TECS-Memoranda of Information Received (MOIRs); TECS-Person Subject
Records; TECS-Vehicle Subject Records; TECS Reports of Investigation; Seized Assets and Case
Tracking System-Arrest Seizure Incidents; Arrival and Departure Information System (ADIS);
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT); Electronic Visa Update System (EVUS);
Global Enrollment System (GES); Port Radiation Inspection, Detection & Evaluation (PRIDE);
Automated Targeting System-Passenger Name Record (PNR); Document and Media Exploitation
(DOMEX); Agriculture Programs Trade Liaison (APTL)) (internal citations omitted).
241. Id. at 25-26 (databases affiliated with ICE that "enable CBP's collection of this information"
under AFI and CIRS include: Enforcement Integrated Database-Civilian Detention Data; Enforcement
Integrated Database-1213, Record of Deportable-Inadmissible Alien; Enforcement Integrated Database-
Incidents; Enforcement Integrated Database-Apprehension (Deprecated); Enforcement Integrated
Database-Detention (Deprecating); Enforcement Integrated Database-inadmissible (Deprecating);
Enforcement Integrated Database-Seizures (Deprecating); Detention and Removal Operations-LEAD
Report; Legacy ICE Intelligence Information Reports; Finished ICE Intelligence Products; Legacy ICE
NameTrace; Legacy National Security Entry Exit Registration System (NSEERS); Student and
Exchange Visitor Information (SEVIS)-Exchange; Student and Exchange Visitor Information (SEVIS)-
Student; Biometric Identification Transnational Migration Alert Program (BITMAP)) (internal citation
omitted).
242. Id. at 26 (databases affiliated with USCIS include: Central Index System (CIS); Computer
Linked Application Information Management System (CLAIMS 3); Computer Linked Application
Information Management System (CLAIMS 4); Customer Profile Management System (CPMS); and
National File Tracking System (NFTO)).
243. Id. (a database affiliated with TSA includes Secure Flight Passenger Data (SFPB)).
244. Id. at 26-27 (a database affiliated with CISA includes Automated Biometric Identification
System (IDENT)).
245. Id. at 27-29 (databases associated with other governmental and commercial data includes:
U.S. Department of State Consular Electronic Application Center (CEAC); U.S. Department of State
Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES); U.S. Department of State
Consular Consolidated Database (CCD); Homeland Security Law Enforcement Information Sharing
Service (LEIS)-State and Local Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS); Homeland Security Law
Enforcement Information Sharing Service-National Data Exchange (N-DEx); FBI National Crime
Information Center (NCIC); DOS [U.S. Department of State]/DOC [U.S. Department of
Commerce]/Treasury Consolidated Screening List; National Law Enforcement Telecommunication
System (NLETS) Driver; National Law Enforcement Telecommunication System (NLETS) Vehicle;
Canadian National Law Enforcement Telecommunication System (NLETS)); see also SOCIAL MEDIA
MONITORING REPORT, supra note 1, at 35-36.
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CMPPA (Computer Matching Privacy Protection Act of 1988) that
amended the Privacy Act of 1974. The CMPPA was enacted to address
"large numbers of individuals [that] were subjected to automated scrutiny
with potentially adverse consequences, and that in actual practice, that
meant automated comparisons of automated data bases... [and] that use of
computers could 'greatly magnify the harm' to an individual., 246 However,
CMPPA does not include "matches performed, by an agency (or component
thereof) which performs as its principal function any activity pertaining to
the enforcement of criminal laws[.] ' ' 247 Here, at least one commenter has
questioned whether criminal law enforcement is at the center of the A-File
System of Records or whether the A-File System of Records is
predominantly a record system that serves civil law purposes (e.g.,
adjudication of immigration benefits and immigration status).
2 48
The CMPPA is limited in its reach.2 49 The Federal Register Notice
246. Privacy Act of 1974; Final Guidance Interpreting the Provisions of Public Law 100-503, the
Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 54 Fed. Reg. 25,818 (Office of Mgmt. &
Budget June 19, 1989).
247. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(8)(B)(iii). The Privacy Act defines the term "matching program" as
including a "computerized comparison" of:
(i) two or more automated systems of records or a system of records with non-
Federal records for the purpose of--
(I) establishing or verifying the eligibility of, or continuing compliance
with statutory and regulatory requirements by, applicants for, recipients
or beneficiaries of, participants in, or providers of services with respect
to, cash or in-kind assistance or payments under Federal benefit
programs, or
(II) recouping payments or delinquent debts under such Federal benefit
programs, or
(ii) two or more automated Federal personnel or payroll systems of records or a
system of Federal personnel or payroll records with non-Federal records[.]
§ 552a(a)(8)(A)(i-ii).
248. See, e.g., NEILSON, supra note 62, at 5.
249. The Privacy Act states that the definition of the term "matching program" does not include
matches cited:
(i) ... to produce aggregate statistical data without any personal identifiers;
(ii) . . . to support any research or statistical project, the specific data of which
may not be used to make decisions concerning the rights, benefits, or privileges
of specific individuals;
(iii) . . . by an agency (or component thereof) which performs as its principal
function any activity pertaining to the enforcement of criminal laws, subsequent
to the initiation of a specific criminal or civil law enforcement investigation of a
named person or persons for the purpose of gathering evidence against such
person or persons;
(iv) matches of tax information...[J
(v) matches--
(I) using records predominantly relating to Federal personnel, that are
performed for routine administrative purposes...; or
(II) conducted by an agency using only records from systems of records
maintained by that agency;
1308
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published on June 19, 1989, promulgating Final Guidance in the
implementation of CMPPA, explained that: "It should be noted that the four
elements, (i.e., computerized comparison, categories of subjects, Federal
benefit program, and matching purpose) all must be present before a
matching program is covered under the provisions of the Computer
Matching [and Privacy Protection] Act [of 1988].",25° It could be argued by
DHS that the issues raised by the commenters in response to the DHS
Federal Register Notice, "Privacy Act of 1974; System of Records,"
published on September 18, 2017, fall outside of the scope of the CMPPA
because DHS will likely argue that the data collection serves both criminal
law enforcement purposes and counterterrorism objectives, and because
DHS could contend that the four elements are not satisfied.2 51
b. Categories of Individuals
Pursuant to the Privacy Act, when an agency establishes or revises a
system of records, it is required to publish a notice in the Federal Register
detailing the categories of individuals whose information will be stored in
the system of records.252 The September 2017 DHS Notice introduces four
new categories of individuals covered by the system: legal guardians,
representatives of the physically or developmentally disabled or mentally
impaired, civil surgeons, and law enforcement officers who certify
if the purpose of the match is not to take any adverse financial, personnel,
disciplinary, or other adverse action against Federal personnel;
(vi) matches performed for foreign counterintelligence purposes or to produce
background checks for security clearances of Federal personnel or Federal
contractor personnel;
(vii) matches performed incident to a levy described in section 6103(k)(8) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986;
(viii) matches performed pursuant to section 202(x)(3) or 161 l(e)(l) of the Social
Security Act (42 U.S.C. 402(x)(3), 1382(e)(1));
(ix) matches performed by the Secretary of Health and Human Services or the
Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services with respect
to potential fraud, waste, and abuse, including matches of a system of records
with non-Federal records; or
(x) matches performed pursuant to section 3(d)(4) of the Achieving a Better Life
Experience Act of 2014[.]
§ 552a(a)(8)(B)(i-x) (internal citation omitted).
250. Privacy Act of 1974; Final Guidance Interpreting the CMPPA, 54 Fed. Reg. at 25,823.
251. In the final guidance for the CMPPA, the Office of Management and Budget explained that
commenters were concerned that federal agencies may attempt to subvert the intent of the Act. See, e.g.,
id. at 25,818 (noting that commenters expressed concern that federal agencies may engage in "sophistry
or subterfuge, to avoid the reach of the Act.... [A] Federal agency might combine two disparate systems
of records ... into a single system and match data sets within the new system. This activity would not
be covered[.]").
252. § 552a(e)(4)(B).
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requestor cooperation. 253 The Notice does not make clear to what extent the
social media of these individuals will be monitored, leaving open the
possibility that data such as "family history, medical information, and the
fruits of social media searches" on the newly covered categories of
individuals will be collected. 4
2. Conditions of Disclosure and "Routine Uses"
Generally, federal agencies that hold a system of records are prohibited
from disclosing the information to other agencies and other entities "except
pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior consent of, the individual
to whom the record pertains," unless the federal agency can claim that the
disclosure of the record meets certain "conditions of disclosure., 255 One of
253. See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974; System of Records, 82 Fed. Reg. 43,556, 43,559 (Dep't of
Homeland Sec. Sept. 18, 2017).
254. NEILSON, supra note 62, at 4.
255. § 552a(b):
Conditions of disclosure.-No agency shall disclose any record which is
contained in a system of records by any means of communication to any person,
or to another agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior
written consent of, the individual to whom the record pertains, unless disclosure
of the record would be-
(]) to those officers and employees of the agency which maintains the record who
have a need for the record in the performance of their duties;
(2) required under section 552 of this title;
(3) for a routine use as defined in subsection (a)(7) of this section and described
under subsection (e)(4)(D) of this section;
(4) to the Bureau of the Census for purposes of planning or carrying out a census
or survey or related activity pursuant to the provisions of title 13;
(5) to a recipient who has provided the agency with advance adequate written
assurance that the record will be used solely as a statistical research or reporting
record, and the record is to be transferred in a form that is not individually
identifiable;
(6) to the National Archives and Records Administration as a record which has
sufficient historical or other value to warrant its continued preservation by the
United States Government, or for evaluation by the Archivist of the United States
or the designee of the Archivist to determine whether the record has such value;
(7) to another agency or to an instrumentality of any governmental jurisdiction
within or under the control of the United States for a civil or criminal law
enforcement activity if the activity is authorized by law, and if the head of the
agency or instrumentality has made a written request to the agency which
maintains the record specifying the particular portion desired and the law
enforcement activity for which the record is sought;
(8) to a person pursuant to a showing of compelling circumstances affecting the
health or safety of an individual if upon such disclosure notification is transmitted
to the last known address of such individual;
(9) to either House of Congress, or, to the extent of matter within its jurisdiction,
any committee or subcommittee thereof, any joint committee of Congress or
subcommittee of any such joint committee;
(10) to the Comptroller General, or any of his authorized representatives, in the
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the conditions of disclosure is a "routine use" of the record.256 The Privacy
Act states that proper notice "shall include.., each routine use of the records
contained in the system, including the categories of users and the purpose
of such use.
257
The September 2017 DHS Notice additionally states that several
modifications to the databases fall within "routine uses[,] ' '258 yet, the Notice
does not specify precisely the nature of the modifications. 59 Under the
Privacy Act, the government may disclose to other individuals or agencies
the information it has stored on an individual without the individual's
consent when the sharing of that information conforms to "routine use," one
of the statutory conditions of disclosure. 260 The "routine use" condition of
disclosure under the Privacy Act can allow for a broad expansion over time
of the entities to which an individual's collected records may be
disclosed.261
The Notice further specifies that "[a] notice detailing this system of
records was last published in the Federal Register on November 21, 2013,
as the DHS/USCIS/ICE/CBP001 Alien File, Index, and National File
Tracking System of Records, 78 FR 69864." The September 2017 DHS
Notice states that routine use E has been updated to comply with a new
policy set forth by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).2 62 The
Notice does not specify what revisions were made but did provide an
updated list of all routine uses pursuant to the Privacy Act.263 In contrast,
the previous time DHS modified the routine uses of the system of records
in 2013, DHS specified that it had added five new uses, modified eight
more, and provided a summary of what changes were being made and why
they were being made. 264
course of the performance of the duties of the Government Accountability Office;
(11) pursuant to the order of a court of competent jurisdiction; or





258. Privacy Act of 1974, 82 Fed. Reg. at 43,556.
259. See NEILSON, supra note 62, at 3.
260. § 552a(b)(3).
261. The Privacy Act of 1974, EPIC, https://epic.org/privacy/1974act/ [https://perma.cc/6TXV-
Q2XH].
262. Privacy of 1974, 82 Fed. Reg. at 43,556 (identifying substantive changes to G and K).
263. § 552a-(e)(4)(D).
264. Compare Privacy Act of 1974, 82 Fed. Reg. at 43,556, with Privacy Act of 1974; Department
of Homeland Security U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, U.S. Customs and Border Protection-001 Alien File, Index, and National File Tracking
System of Records, 78 Fed. Reg. 69,864 (Nov. 21, 2013).
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3. Exemptions
As discussed above, conditions of disclosure under the Privacy Act
describe certain conditions present for DHS to legally disclose information
to others-including other federal agencies, contractors, and other private
individuals.2 65 Unlike conditions of disclosure, certain Privacy Act
exemptions allow federal agencies to prevent an individual from being able
to access the records that the agency possesses on him or her.266 Some of
the exemptions operate to prevent individuals from accessing records held
about them by, for example, denying an individual's request "to gain access
to his record or to any information pertaining to him which is contained in
the system [of records]" and exempting the agency from "establish[ing]
procedures whereby an individual can be notified in response to his
request[j.]" 267
The Privacy Act exemptions are divided into two categories. The first
category is characterized as "[g]eneral exemptions,, 268 and includes a law
enforcement exemption. 269 The second category pertains to "[s]pecific
265. See, e.g., § 552a(b)(1)-12).
266. See, e.g., §§ 552a(d)(5), (j)(l)-(2), (k)(l)(7).
267. DHS claims it is exempt from § 552a(d) ("Access to records.-Each agency that maintains
a system of records shall--(1) upon request by any individual to gain access to his record or to any
information pertaining to him which is contained in the system[]") and § 552a(f):
(f) Agency rules. In order to carry out the provisions of this section, each agency
that maintains a system of records shall promulgate rules, in accordance with the
requirements (including general notice) of section 553 of this title, which shall-
(I) establish procedures whereby an individual can be notified in
response to his request if any system of records named by the individual
contains a record pertaining to him[.]
Id.
268. § 552a(j).
269. § 552a(j)(2). A system of record held by a federal agency is exempted under the Law
Enforcement "General Exemptions" if the record system is:
(j) General exemptions.-
(2) maintained by an agency or component thereof which performs as its principal
function any activity pertaining to the enforcement of criminal laws, including
police efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or to apprehend criminals, and
the activities of prosecutors, courts, correctional, probation, pardon, or parole
authorities, and which consists of (A) information compiled for the purpose of
identifying individual criminal offenders and alleged offenders and consisting
only of identifying data and notations of arrests, the nature and disposition of
criminal charges, sentencing, confinement, release, and parole and probation
status; (B) information compiled for the purpose of a criminal investigation,
including reports of informants and investigators, and associated with an
identifiable individual; or (C) reports identifiable to an individual compiled at any
stage of the process of enforcement of the criminal laws from arrest or indictment
through release from supervision. At the time rules are adopted under this
subsection, the agency shall include in the statement required under section 55
3(c)
of this title, the reasons why the system of records is to be exempted from a
provision of this section.
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exemptions., 270 Here, the September 2017 DHS Notice specifically claims
exemptions under both.
In the September 2017 DHS Notice, DHS exempts the system of records
from multiple provisions of the Privacy Act pursuant to the "general
exemption" allowed for law enforcement purposes under 5 U.S.C. §
552a(j)(2). 271 The law enforcement exemption allows for the agency under
subsection (j)(2) to exempt systems of records from certain provisions of
the Privacy Act when the system of records pertains to an agency or
component of an agency whose "principal function" is the enforcement of
criminal laws. 2 72 Furthermore, for the law enforcement exemption to apply,
the information collected must pertain to identifying an offender or
suspected offender, and the data must, in some way, relate to furthering
some stage of criminal law enforcement: investigation, arrest, prosecution,
parole, etc.273 The Notice states that when DHS receives a record from
another source system, and the system is covered by the law enforcement
exemption, DHS will claim the same exemption. 74 Further, the Notice
states that DHS will also claim any additional exemptions that are attached
to the original system of records.2 75
DHS also claims "specific exemptions" under subsections (k)(1) and
(k)(2).276 The Privacy Act's specific exemptions under 5 U.S.C. §
552a(k)(1) and (k)(2) allow the head of a federal agency to promulgate rules
of exemption from any system of records held by the agency under certain
Id.
270. § 552a(k).
271. "The Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted this system from the following
provisions of the Privacy Act pursuant to § 552a(j)(2): 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (c)(4), (d), (e)(1), (e)(2),
(e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I), (e)(5), (e)(8), (e)(12), (f), (g)(l), and (h)." Privacy Act of 1974;




274. Privacy Act of 1974, 82 Fed. Reg. at 43,564 ("When this system receives a record from
another system exempted in that source system under 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), DHS will claim the same
exemptions for those records that are claimed for the original primary systems of records from which
they originated and claims any additional exemptions set forth here.").
275. Id.
276. Id. ("Additionally, the Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted this system from the
following provisions of the Privacy Act pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1) and (k)(2): 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3),
(d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(1), and (f)[]"); see also Appendix C.
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provisions. 277 The exemption that DHS claims under (k)(1) 278 relates to 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(1), allowing an agency to withhold records when the
information is related to national defense or foreign policy interests and has
been classified by Executive Order.279 The specific exemption under (k)(2)
allows an agency to withhold information it has collected on an individual
for law enforcement purposes that are outside the scope of subsection 0)(2);
however, subsection (k)(2) states that if the individual loses any right, or
entitlement under federal law, the information must be disclosed to the
individual upon request unless it would threaten the identity of a
government informant.280 Many of the DHS specific exemptions claimed
under (k)(1) and (k)(2) are also encompassed in 0)(2).281
B. Undermining Trust in the Privacy Act. Potential Misuse and Overuse
of Privacy Act's Exemptions by DHS
DHS's recent exemption claims under the September 2017 DHS Notice
is consistent with the post-9/11 practice of relying upon certain facets of the
Privacy Act to bypass key requirements of the Privacy Act. Since the
terrorist acts of September 11, 2001, DHS has avoided the record access
277. See § 552a(k)(l)(2):
(k) Specific exemptions.-The head of any agency may promulgate rules, in
accordance with the requirements (including general notice) of sections
553(b)(1), (2), and (3), (c), and (e) of this title, to exempt any system of records
within the agency from subsections (c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I) and
(f) of this section if the system of records is--
(1) subject to the provisions of section 552(b)(1) of this title;
(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other
than material within the scope of subsection 0)(2) of this section:
Provided, however, That if any individual is denied any right, privilege,
or benefit that he would otherwise be entitled by Federal law, or for
which he would otherwise be eligible, as a result of the maintenance of
such material, such material shall be provided to such individual, except
to the extent that the disclosure of such material would reveal the identity
of a source who furnished information to the Government under an
express promise that the identity of the source would be held in
confidence, or, prior to the effective date of this section, under an implied
promise that the identity of the source would be held in confidence[.]
Id.; see also Appendix C.
278. § 552a(k)(1) ("subject to the provisions of section 552(b)(1) of this title[.]"); see also
Appendix C.
279. § 552(b)(l)(A)-(B):
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are--
(l)(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive
order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy
and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order[.]
Id.
280. § 552a(k)(2); see also Appendix C.
281. Compare Appendix B, with Appendix D.
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requirements of the Privacy Act in ways that could be viewed as directly
oppositional to the legislative intent of the law, as it was originally
considered and passed by Congress in 1974.
For example, DHS has increasingly claimed exemptions under the
Privacy Act. In November 2005, the DHS Office of the Inspector General
(OIG) claimed exemption under Privacy Act for its "Investigations Data
Management System., 282 In October 2008, DHS claimed exemptions from
the Privacy Act for Grievances, Appeals, and Disciplinary Action.2 83 In
December 2008, DHS claimed an exemption of non-criminal investigative
information.28 4 DHS also announced in December 2008 that it would
maintain a record system to record individuals involved in international
trade and claimed law enforcement exemptions under the system.285 In
September 2013, DHS created a record collection system for TSA's
voluntary PreCheck program that pre-screens low risk passengers to
expedite screening at airports and U.S. security checkpoints, and claimed
multiple Privacy Act exemptions.2 86
On May 4, 2017, DHS invoked the law enforcement exemption of the
Privacy Act, limiting access to the FALCON database system of records. 287
282. Privacy Act of 1974; Implementation of Exemptions, 70 Fed. Reg. 67,931, 67,931 (Dep't of
Homeland Sec. Nov. 9, 2005) (claiming exemptions for law enforcement and investigatory purposes;
contending that transparency can reveal information that could threaten current investigations or the
safety of confidential informants).
283. Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of Exemptions; Grievances, Appeals, and Disciplinary
Action System of Records, 73 Fed. Reg. 62,214, 62,215 (Dep't of Homeland Sec. Oct. 20, 2008)
(claiming exemptions for law enforcement and national security reasons pertaining to electronic and
paper records related to DHS functions).
284. Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of Exemptions; DHS/USSS-003 Non-Criminal
Investigation Information System, 73 Fed. Reg., 77,543 77,543-44 (Dec. 19, 2008) (DHS/USSS
claiming exemption for the non-criminal investigative information system for investigation of
individuals involved in non-criminal statutory investigations; claiming exemptions for information that
may concern training, techniques, and confidential information of USSS agents).
285. Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of Exemptions; DHS/CBP-010 Persons Engaged in
International Trade in Customs and Border Protection Licensed/Regulated Activities, 73 Fed. Reg.
77,541, 77,541-42 (Dec. 19, 2008) (updating system of records of individuals engaged in international
trade in CBP regulated/licensed activities; claiming exemptions for law enforcement and national
security reasons and to prevent individuals under investigation from frustrating the investigatory
process).
286. Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of Exemptions; Department of Homeland Security
Transportation Security Administration, DHS/TSA-021, TSA PreTM Application Program System of
Records, 78 Fed. Reg. 55,657, 55,657 (Sept. 11, 2013) ("TSA is establishing this new system of records
... to perform a security threat assessment to identify individuals who present a low risk to transportation
security."). DHS claims exemptions apply to the new system of records: "For these records or
information only, as necessary and appropriate to protect such information, in accordance with 5 U.S.C.
552a(k)(1) and (k)(2), DHS also will claim the original exemptions for these records or information from
the following Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. 552a) subsections: (c)(3); (d); (e)(l); (e)(4)(G), (H), and (1); and
(f)." Id. at 55,658.
287. Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of Exemptions; Department of Homeland Security/U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement-016 FALCON Search and Analysis System of Records, 82 Fed.
Reg. 20,844, 20,844-46 (May 4, 2017).
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As discussed above, the FALCON Search and Analysis System of Records
is an ICE data tool used by the Office of Homeland Security Investigations.
Social media surveillance appears to be enhanced through enabling ICE to
conduct research and analysis of multiple databases through FALCON.288
In June and July 2017, the Trump Administration further published
several Federal Register Notices pursuant the Privacy Act, purportedly to
prevent individuals who otherwise might be able to access records under the
Privacy Act from accessing information from DHS systems of record. For
instance, on June 14, 2017, DHS published a Federal Register Notice
claiming the law enforcement exemption for the protection of property of
the DHS system of records. 289 On July 17, 2017, DHS claimed the law
enforcement exemption of the "Notice of Arrival and Departure System of
Records." 290 On July 27, 2017, DHS published a Federal Register Notice
claiming the law enforcement exemption of all "Foreign Access
Management System of Records.,
291
The use of the Privacy Act to limit access to information to immigrants
and noncitizens appears to be a priority for the Trump Administration. On
January 25, 2017, shortly after Trump's inauguration, Privacy Act
protections were eliminated for individuals who were not U.S. citizens or
Lawful Permanent Residents.292 An Executive Order titled, "Enhancing
Public Safety in the Interior of the United States," directs federal agencies
to "ensure that their privacy policies exclude persons who are not United
States citizens or lawful permanent residents from the protections of the
Privacy Act regarding personally identifiable information" in a manner
consistent with law.293
288. Id.
289. Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of Exemptions; Department of Homeland
Security/ALL-025 Law Enforcement Authority in Support of the Protection of Property Owned,
Occupied, or Secured by the Department of Homeland Security System of Records, 82 Fed. Reg. 27,218
(June 14, 2017) (DHS claiming law enforcement exemption is necessary to protect activities of DHS
and prevent individuals subject of the information from frustrating DHS operations).
290. Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of Exemptions; Department of Homeland
Security/United States Coast Guard-029 Notice of Arrival and Departure System of Records, 82 Fed.
Reg. 32,613, 32,613 (July 17, 2017) (DHS claiming exemptions will help DHS/USCG to help ensure
maritime safety and security because information in records "may be used to support DHS national
security or law enforcement activities.").
291. Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of Exemptions; Department of Homeland
Security/ALL -039 Foreign Access Management System of Records, 82 Fed. Reg. 34,884 (July 27,
2017) (DHS claiming exemptions for these records because they relate to national security, law
enforcement, intelligence activities, and immigration).
292. Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799 (Jan. 30, 2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-rder-enhancing-public-safety-interior-
united-states/ [https://perma.cc/NE8 U-D9H3].
293. Id. ("Sec. 14. Privacy Act. Agencies shall, to the extent consistent with applicable law, ensure
that their privacy policies exclude persons who are not United States citizens or lawful permanent
residents from the protections of the Privacy Act regarding personally identifiable information."); see
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The use of the law enforcement exemption in the case of the September
2017 DHS Notice further raises concerns beyond restricting access to
information. Experts observe that DHS claims to the broad exemptions
under the Privacy Act will prevent individuals from understanding how
DHS or the federal government may use the social media data in adverse
actions. Specifically, DHS claims multiple Privacy Act exemptions in the
September 2017 DHS Notice, including the Privacy Act's law enforcement
exemption, in order to justify the withholding of "agency procedures
whereby individuals can be notified that the system contains their [social
media and other] records, and procedures for accessing or contesting the
content of records, as would otherwise be required by the Privacy Act [if
the exemption had not been claimed]."294
As a result of the broad claim of exemptions under the Privacy Act by
DHS, and due to the fact that the social media data may be used to inform
multiple intelligence products that are part of complex law enforcement and
national security data analytic environments, the accuracy of the algorithms
or data analysis conducted by DHS or other federal agencies cannot be
assessed and checked for inaccuracies by the individual.2 95 At least one
commenter observed that the law enforcement exemption did not appear to
be "consistent with the Department's own description of its functions and
purposes[,]" which "are primarily civil rather than criminal. '296 In response
to the September 2017 DHS Notice, the commenter asserted: "Certainly, the
trust and confidence of the public is a worthwhile goal for any governmental
system of records, but especially one with such far-reaching impact on the
lives of so many categories of stakeholders., 297
The legislative history reveals that Congress intended the Privacy Act's
exemptions should be kept to an "absolute minimum.''298 Exemptions
also DHS Memorandum by Jonathan Cantor, DHS Acting Chief Privacy Officer, Privacy Policy
Guidance Memorandum (Apr. 17, 2017) (implementing Executive Order 13,768, "Enhancing Public
Safety in the Interior of the United States on January 25, 2017"); Gabby Orr & Andrew Restuccia, How
Stephen Miller Made Immigration Personal, POLITICO (Apr. 22, 2019, 5:01 AM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/04/22/stephen-miller-immigration-trump- 1284287
[https://perma.cc/TQ3B-WNN6] (describing how eliminating Privacy Act protections for non-citizens
potentially facilitated ability ofDHS to publicize the "full names and pending criminal charges-in press
releases about immigrants [DHS] had apprehended, detained, or planned to deport[]").
294. Id.
295. SOCIAL MEDIA MONITORING REPORT, supra note 1, at 6-7 (explaining "the reliability of
the information ingested by these systems is not verified; DHS has exempted them from the relevant
requirements of the Privacy Act, and there are functionally no mechanisms for the individuals whose
information is included to challenge the accuracy of the data.").
296. Id. at 5 (contending that the DHS Notice published on September 18, 2017, titled, "Privacy
Act of 1974; System of Records," included a predominantly civil law purpose in updating the DHS
system of records).
297. NEILSON, supra note 62, at 5 n.8.
298. S. REP. NO. 93-1183, supra note 31, at 20.
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should only be allowed for national defense, foreign policy, and certain law
enforcement and intelligence matters where "access and challenge rights are
found to damage the purpose for which the information was collected.,
299
Allowing exemptions only in these scenarios encourages government
accountability, efficient goverunent operations, and a "public sense of
social justice."3 °° Congress explained that "'authentic rights to access and
challenge"' to the government's policies under the Privacy Act will force
government to develop persuasive and legitimate reasons to support those
policies.
30 1
Congress further underscored the need to avoid secrecy. The legislative
history explained that: "The [U.S. Senate] Committee [on Government
Operations] believes that it is fundamental to the implementation of any
privacy legislation that no system of personal information be operated or
maintained in secret by a Federal agency., 30 2 The Committee noted that the
government should refrain "from compulsory data collection" systems to
respect the freedom and privacy interests of the citizenry.3 °3 In addition, the
Committee recognized the need not "to jeopardize the collection of
intelligence information related to national defense or foreign policy, or...
. [expose classified information to] persons who do not have an appropriate
security clearance or need to know." 304 At the same time, Congress also
made clear that the Privacy Act exemptions relating to national security and
classified information was "not intended to provide a blanket exemption to
all information systems or files maintained by an agency which deal with
national defense and foreign policy information.,
30 5
From the Privacy Act's legislative record, it can be discerned that it was
Congress's intent that the exemptions for intelligence information and
information related to law enforcement investigations should be limited to
"certain areas of federal records [that] are of such a highly sensitive nature
that they must be exempted from its provisions .... [for example,] a general
exemption from most of the bill's operative provisions to systems of records
maintained by the Central Intelligence Agency and those used for criminal
299. Id. at 21.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 21 (quoting Report submitted to the U.S. Dep't of Justice by Project SEARCH,
Committee on Security and Privacy, Technical Report No. 2 at 28 (July 1970)).
302. Id. at 74.
303. Id. at 45 (explaining intent of Subsection 201 (a) of the Privacy Act: "'[I]n terms of privacy[,]
there should be a general policy to extend the zones of personal and group freedom from compulsory
data collection so that matters that ought not to be considered in making decisions about individuals do
not become part of the formal record at all"') (quoting National Academy of Science recommendation).
304. Id. at 74.
305. Id.
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justice purposes[.] ' ' 30 6 Even for agencies that fall under the exemptions, the
federal agencies must publish in the Federal Register "certain identifying
characteristics about virtually all systems of records under their control...
[t]he objective of the bill is that there be no 'secret' government system of
records containing personal information about individuals. 30 7
Congress observed that in order to protect civil liberties, "[n]ever should
economy or efficiency or administrative convenience be used to justify the
exemption from or modification of any of the safeguard requirements set
forth in this bill. 30 8 Exemptions should only apply when societal interests
overwhelmingly outweigh individual privacy.30 9 The limited exemptions in
place were intended to protect against the release of information that had
the potential to threaten national security interests or the potential to
interfere with an ongoing criminal investigations, for example. Congress
explained that the exemptions were intended to be read very narrowly by
the federal agencies and "when exemptions must be made, they must be
defined in very specific terms., 3 10 "By narrowing the exemption categories
and defining them in specific terms related to the use of records rather than
to the agency maintaining them," Congress hoped to assure the public "that
the constitutional rights of individuals w[ould] be protected and w[ould] not
be sacrificed to administrative discretion, expediency or whim."31'
CONCLUSION
The relationship between citizen and state is rapidly changing in
profound ways in the digital age.3 12 This is a direct consequence of a rapidly
evolving digital economy that privacy experts such as Shoshana Zuboff
describe as a surveillance economy and surveillance capitalism and what
Julie Cohen has referred to as informational capitalism and the surveillance-
306. Privacy Act of 1974, H. REP. NO. 93-1416, REPORT OF THE U.S. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS TO ACCOMPANY TOGETHER WITH ADDITIONAL VIEWS [TO ACCOMPANY
H.R. 16373] 3 (1974) [hereinafter H. REP. No. 93-1416] (elaborating that the general exemption from
the Privacy Act encompassed criminal justice databases "such as computerized systems of the National
Crime Information Center (NCIC), maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other Federal
criminal history file systems.").
307. Id. at 4.
308. Id. at 37.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 38.
312. See generally COHEN, supra note 4; CONSTITUTION 3.0: FREEDOM AND TECHNOLOGICAL
CHANGE (Jeffrey Rosen & Benjamin Wittes eds., 2011); DONOHUE , supra note 10; GRANICK, supra
note 8; GRAY, supra note 4; JON L. MILLS, PRIVACY: THE LOST RIGHT (2008); Nissenbaum, supra note
4; JEFFREY ROSEN, THE NAKED CROWD: RECLAIMING SECURITY AND FREEDOM IN AN ANXIOUS AGE
(2004); SLOBOGIN, supra note 4; BENJAMIN WITTES & GABRIELLA BLUM, THE FUTURE OF VIOLENCE:
ROBOTS AND GERMS, HACKERS AND DRONES (2015).
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innovation complex.3 13 The digital age and the Information Society is also
leading to what constitutional law scholars Jack Balkin and Sanford
Levinson refer to as "The National Surveillance State. 314
The introduction of social media data collection programs by DHS
requires congressional approval or some other legal support, as the Privacy
Act does not give DHS or any other federal agency the authority to collect
data. A Federal Register Notice announcing a modification of a system of
records under the Privacy Act does not provide sufficient legal justification
for the vast expansion of a system of records to include social media
platforms. To the extent that it could be argued that the social media data
collection by DHS might create a new system of records, it is inappropriate
to characterize social media data collection within the A-File system as
simply updating an existing system of records. Characterizing social media
data collection as a modification of an existing system of records routinizes
social media data collection without congressional approval. This represents
a new phase of bureaucratized surveillance. Careful attention must be paid
to understand how DHS and other federal agencies increasingly collect and
analyze social media data in programs and methods not expressly identified
as surveillance or intelligence gathering programs.
New intelligence products which aggregate social media data and
facilitate automation of database screening and algorithmic decisionmaking
move beyond a mere update to an existing system of records that mandates
disclosure under the Privacy Act. Rather, the addition of social media data
into surveillance programs may constitute the establishment of an entirely
new system of records for which congressional approval is required. When
an agency wishes to revise or establish a system of records, the agency must
go farther than notifying the public that modifications have been made-the
agency should explain why the system of records was revised or established,
explain the purposes and routine uses of the new types of data being
collected in detail, and explain how it will impact the categories of
individuals being recorded. The congressional purpose and intent of the
Privacy Act is subverted when agencies make vast "updates" and
"modifications" to its systems of records, and use exemptions to bypass the
Privacy Act's requirements that individuals would have access to the data
being collected on them.
The social media data collection programs recently introduced by DHS
313. ZUBOFF, supra note 1, at 94; COHEN, supra note 4; Julie E. Cohen, The Surveillance-
Innovation Complex: The Irony of the Participatory Turn, in THE PARTICIPATORY CONDITION IN THE
DIGITAL AGE 207-26 (Darin Barney et al. eds., 2016).
314. See generally Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN.
L. REV. 1 (2008); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change: From
Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489 (2006).
[VOL. 96:12671320
THE IRONIC PRIVACY ACT
and other federal agencies provide an important window into understanding
this new form of records system maintenance. The collection will
encompass social media data on both citizens and noncitizens, and was not
explicitly authorized by Congress. 315 Further, widespread social media
surveillance practices across multiple agencies have been underway for
nearly a decade.316 Social media surveillance programs by federal agencies
are largely unregulated and the announcement of social media data
collection programs pursuant to the reporting requirements of the Privacy
Act deserves careful legal attention. The distinction between social media
intelligence, on the one hand, and social media collection for records system
retention is blurring. The privacy impact of systemized and routinized social
media data collection will continue to be obscured without more fully
appreciating how federal agencies such as DHS may be accomplishing
intelligence goals through the Privacy Act in a way that is directly opposite
of what Congress intended to accomplish by enacting the Privacy Act.
In enacting the Privacy Act of 1974, Congress intended to restore public
confidence in government data collection and recordkeeping. Congress
warned that, "[a]ccelerated data sharing of such personally identifiable
information among increasing numbers of Federal agencies through
sophisticated automated systems," could lead to data misuse and abuse.317
Congress observed that the technological advances in databases and
digitization of records, "coupled with the recent disclosures of serious
abuses of governmental authority represented by the collection of personal
dossiers, illegal wiretapping, surveillance of innocent citizens, misuse of
income tax data, and similar types of abuses, have helped to create a
growing distrust, or even fear of their Government in the minds of millions
of Americans. 318
Passage of the Privacy Act was meant to engender trust. Trust in the
Privacy Act is at risk when the Act's notice requirements announce the
social media data collection and analysis systems under the guise of
modifying record collection and retention protocols. This Article concludes
that the social media data collection proposed by DHS requires express
legislative authorization.
315. SOCIAL MEDIA MONITORING REPORT, supra note 1, at 5. Important research has been
published on government secrecy and the need for transparency in agency action, including
intelligence agencies. See, e.g., ELIZABETH GOITEIN, THE NEW ERA OF SECRET LAW 44-47 (2016);
Louis J. Virelli III & Ellen S. Podgor, Secret Policies, 2019 ILL. L. REV. 463 (2019); David Pozen,
Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REv. 257 (2010); Adam M. Samaha, Government Secrets, Constitutional
Law, and Platforms for Judicial Intervention, 53 UCLA L. REv. 909 (2006).
316. See generally SOCIAL MEDIA MONITORING REPORT, supra note 1, app. at 35-36.
317. H. REP. No. 93-1416, supra note 306, at 3.
318. Id.
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APPENDIX A
General Exemptions of the Privacy Act of 1974
Privacy Act 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)(1)
General Exemptions: CIA
The Privacy Act's "General Exemptions" are divided into two parts: 5
U.S.C. § 552a(j)(1) and 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)(2). The "General Exemptions"
under 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)(1) applies to a system of records maintained by
the CIA:
(j) General exemptions.-The head of any agency may
promulgate rules, in accordance with the requirements
(including general notice) of sections 553(b)(1), (2), and
(3), (c), and (e) of this title, to exempt any system of
records within the agency from any part of this section
except subsections (b), (c)(1) and (2), (e)(4)(A) through
(F), (e)(6), (7), (9), (10), and (11), and (i) if the system
of records is
(1) maintained by the Central Intelligence
Agency[.]
Privacy Act 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)(2)
General Exemptions: Law Enforcement
The Law Enforcement "General Exemptions" under the Privacy Act
provides that an agency may claim that certain provisions of the Privacy
Act are exempted when a system of records is:
maintained by an agency or component thereof which
performs as its principal function any activity pertaining
to the enforcement of criminal laws, including police
efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or to
apprehend criminals, and the activities of prosecutors,
courts, correctional, probation, pardon, or parole
authorities, and which consists of (A) information
compiled for the purpose of identifying individual
criminal offenders and alleged offenders and consisting
only of identifying data and notations of arrests, the
nature and disposition of criminal charges, sentencing,
confinement, release, and parole and probation status;
(B) information compiled for the purpose of a criminal
investigation, including reports of informants and
investigators, and associated with an identifiable
individual; or (C) reports identifiable to an individual
compiled at any stage of the process of enforcement of
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the criminal laws from arrest or indictment through
release from supervision.
At the time rules are adopted under this subsection, the agency shall
include in the statement required under section 553(c) of this title,
the reasons why the system of records is to be exempted from a
provision of this section.
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APPENDIX B
Privacy Act's General Law Enforcement Exemptions Claimed by DHS
Under 5 U.S.C. § 552a") (2) in 82 Federal Register 43,556: "DHS Notice
of Modified Privacy Act System of Records" (September 18, 2017)
5 U.S.C. General Exemptions: Privacy Act Provision DHS
§ 552a Claims is Exempted Under 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)(2)
(General Exemptions: Law Enforcement)
(c)(3) 5 U.S.C. § 552a(c)(3): [E]xcept for disclosures made under
subsection (b)(7) of this section, make the accounting made
under paragraph (1) of this subsection available to the
individual named in the record at his request[.]
(c)(4) 5 U.S.C. § 552a(c)(4): [I]nform any person or other agency
about any correction or notation of dispute made by the
agency in accordance with subsection (d) of this section of
any record that has been disclosed to the person or agency
if an accounting of the disclosure was made.
(d) 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d): Access to records.-Each agency that
maintains a system of records shall-(l) upon request by
any individual to gain access to his record or to any
information pertaining to him which is contained in the
system, permit him and upon his request, a person of his
own choosing to accompany him, to review the record and
have a copy made of all or any portion thereof in a form
comprehensible to him, except that the agency may require
the individual to furnish a written statement authorizing
discussion of that individual's record in the accompanying
person's presence;
(2) permit the individual to request amendment of a
record pertaining to him and-
(A) not later than 10 days (excluding Saturdays,
Sundays, and legal public holidays) after the date of receipt
of such request, acknowledge in writing such receipt; and
(B) promptly, either-
(i) make any correction of any portion thereof which the
individual believes is not accurate, relevant, timely, or
complete; or
(ii) inform the individual of its refusal to amend the
record in accordance with his request, the reason for the
refusal, the procedures established by the agency for the
individual to request a review of that refusal by the head of
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the agency or an officer designated by the head of the
agency, and the name and business address of that official;
(3) permit the individual who disagrees with the refusal
of the agency to amend his record to request a review of
such refusal, and not later than 30 days (excluding
Saturdays, Sundays, and legal public holidays) from the
date on which the individual requests such review,
complete such review and make a final determination
unless, for good cause shown, the head of the agency
extends such 30-day period; and if, after his review, the
reviewing official also refuses to amend the record in
accordance with the request, permit the individual to file
with the agency a concise statement setting forth the reasons
for his disagreement with the refusal of the agency, and
notify the individual of the provisions for judicial review of
the reviewing official's determination under subsection
(g)(1)(A) of this section;
(4) in any disclosure, containing information about
which the individual has filed a statement of disagreement,
occurring after the filing of the statement under paragraph
(3) of this subsection, clearly note any portion of the record
which is disputed and provide copies of the statement and,
if the agency deems it appropriate, copies of a concise
statement of the reasons of the agency for not making the
amendments requested, to persons or other agencies to
whom the disputed record has been disclosed; and
(5) nothing in this section shall allow an individual
access to any information compiled in reasonable
anticipation of a civil action or proceeding.
(e)(1) 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) Each agency that maintains a system of
records shall-
(e)(1) maintain in its records only such information about
an individual as is relevant and necessary to accomplish a
purpose of the agency required to be accomplished by
statute or by executive order of the President[.]
(e)(2) 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) Each agency that maintains a system of
records shall-
(e)(2) collect information to the greatest extent practicable
directly from the subject individual when the information
may result in adverse determinations about an individual's
rights, benefits, and privileges under Federal programs[.]
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(e)(3) 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) Each agency that maintains a system of
records shall-
(e)(3) [I]nform each individual whom it asks to supply
information, on the form which it uses to collect the
information or on a separate form that can be retained by
the individual-
(A) the authority (whether granted by statute, or by
executive order of the President) which authorizes the
solicitation of the information and whether disclosure of
such information is mandatory or voluntary;
(B) the principal purpose or purposes for which the
information is intended to be used;
(C) the routine uses which may be made of the
information, as published pursuant to paragraph (4)(D) of
this subsection; and
(D) the effects on him, if any, of not providing all or any
art of the requested information[.]
(e)(4)(G) 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) Each agency that maintains a system of
records shall-
(e)(4) subject to the provisions of paragraph (11) of this
subsection, publish in the Federal Register upon
establishment or revision a notice of the existence and
character of the system of records, which notice shall
include-
(e)(4)(G)("the agency procedures whereby an individual
can be notified at his request if the system of records
contains a record pertaining to himl[.]
(e)(4)(H) 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) Each agency that maintains a system of
records shall-
(e)(4) subject to the provisions of paragraph (11) of this
subsection, publish in the Federal Register upon
establishment or revision a notice of the existence and
character of the system of records, which notice shall
include-
(e)(4)(H) the agency procedures whereby an individual can
be notified at his request how he can gain access to any
record pertaining to him contained in the system of records,
and how he can contest its content") ("the agency
procedures whereby an individual can be notified at his
request how he can gain access to any record pertaining to
him contained in the system of records, and how he can
contest its content[.]
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(e)(4)(I) 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) Each agency that maintains a system of
records shall-
(e)(4) subject to the provisions of paragraph (11) of this
subsection, publish in the Federal Register upon
establishment or revision a notice of the existence and
character of the system of records, which notice shall
include-
(e)(4)(I) the categories of sources of records in the system[.]
(e)(5) 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) Each agency that maintains a system of
records shall-
(e)(5) maintain all records which are used by the agency in
making any determination about any individual with such
accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness as is
reasonably necessary to assure fairness to the individual in
the determination[.]
(e)(8) 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) Each agency that maintains a system of
records shall-
(e)(8) make reasonable efforts to serve notice on an
individual when any record on such individual is made
available to any person under compulsory legal process
when such process becomes a matter of public record[.]
(e)(12) 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) Each agency that maintains a system of
records shall-
(e)(12) if such agency is a recipient agency or a source
agency in a matching program with a non-Federal agency,
with respect to any establishment or revision of a matching
program, at least 30 days prior to conducting such program,
publish in the Federal Register notice of such establishment
or revision.
(f) 5 U.S.C. § 552a(f) Agency rules.-In order to carry out the
provisions of this section, each agency that maintains a
system of records shall promulgate rules, in accordance
with the requirements (including general notice) of section
553 of this title, which shall-
(1) establish procedures whereby an individual can be
notified in response to his request if any system of records
named by the individual contains a record pertaining to him;
(2) defie reasonable times, places, and requirements for
identifying an individual who requests his record or
information pertaining to him before the agency shall make
the record or information available to the individual;
(3) establish procedures for the disclosure to an
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individual upon his request of his record or information
pertaining to him, including special procedure, if deemed
necessary, for the disclosure to an individual of medical
records, including psychological records, pertaining to him;
(4) establish procedures for reviewing a request from an
individual concerning the amendment of any record or
information pertaining to the individual, for making a
determination on the request, for an appeal within the
agency of an initial adverse agency determination, and for
whatever additional means may be necessary for each
individual to be able to exercise fully his rights under this
section; and
(5) establish fees to be charged, if any, to any individual
for making copies of his record, excluding the cost of any
search for and review of the record.
The Office of the Federal Register shall biennially
compile and publish the rules promulgated under this
subsection and agency notices published under subsection
(e)(4) of this section in a form available to the public at low
cost.
(g)(1) 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1) Civil remedies.-Whenever any
agency
(A) makes a determination under subsection (d)(3) of
this section not to amend an individual's record in
accordance with his request, or fails to make such review in
conformity with that subsection;
(B) refuses to comply with an individual request under
subsection (d)(1) of this section;
(C) fails to maintain any record concerning any
individual with such accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and
completeness as is necessary to assure fairness in any
determination relating to the qualifications, character,
rights, or opportunities of, or benefits to the individual that
may be made on the basis of such record, and consequently
a determination is made which is adverse to the individual;
or
(D) fails to comply with any other provision of this
section, or any rule promulgated thereunder, in such a way
as to have an adverse effect on an individual,
the individual may bring a civil action against the
agency, and the district courts of the United States shall
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have jurisdiction in the matters under the provisions of this
subsection.
(h) 5 U.S.C. § 552a(h) For the purposes of this section, the
parent of any minor, or the legal guardian of any individual
who has been declared to be incompetent due to physical or
mental incapacity or age by a court of competent
jurisdiction, may act on behalf of the individual.
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APPENDIX C
Specific Exemptions of the Privacy Act of 1974
Privacy Act 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k)(1)
Specific Exemptions: Classified Information for National Defense
or Foreign Policy
The Privacy Act's "Specific Exemptions" are divided into two parts: 5
U.S.C. § 552a(k)(1) and 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k)(2). Under 5 U.S.C. §
552a(k)(1), the Privacy Act states that the (k)(1) specific exemptions are:
5 U.S.C. § 552a(k): The head of any agency may
promulgate rules, in accordance with the requirements
(including general notice) of sections 553(b)(1), (2), and
(3), (c), and (e) of this title, to exempt any system of
records within the agency from subsections (c)(3), (d),
(e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I) and (f) of this section if the
system of records is-
(1) subject to the provisions of section 552(b)(1)
of this title[.]
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) provides that:
This section does not apply to matters that are-
(1)(A) specifically authorized under criteria established
by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of
national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact
properly classified pursuant to such Executive order[.]
Privacy Act 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k)(2)
Specific Exemptions: Head of Agency Promulgated Rules to Cover
Other Investigatory Material
The Privacy Act's "Specific Exemptions" under the Privacy Act provides
that an agency may claim that certain provisions of the Privacy Act are
exempted when a system of records is:
5 U.S.C. § 552a(k): The head of any agency may
promulgate rules, in accordance with the requirements
(including general notice) of sections 553(b)(1), (2), and
(3), (c), and (e) of this title, to exempt any system of
records within the agency from subsections (c)(3), (d),
(e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I) and (f) of this section if the
system of records is-
(2) investigatory material compiled for law
enforcement purposes, other than material within the
scope of subsection (j)(2) of this section: Provided,
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however, That if any individual is denied any right,
privilege, or benefit that he would otherwise be entitled
by Federal law, or for which he would otherwise be
eligible, as a result of the maintenance of such material,
such material shall be provided to such individual,
except to the extent that the disclosure of such material
would reveal the identity of a source who furnished
information to the Government under an express
promise that the identity of the source would be held in
confidence, or, prior to the effective date of this section,
under an implied promise that the identity of the source
would be held in confidence[.]
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APPENDIX D
Privacy Act's Specific Exemptions Claimed by DHS in 82 Federal
Register 43,556: "DHS Notice of Modified Privacy Act System of
Records" (September 18, 2017)
5 U.S.C. Specific Exemptions: Privacy Act Provision DHS
§ 552a Claims is Exempted Under 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k)(1)
(Specific Exemptions Relating to Classified
Information) and 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k)(2) (Specific
Exemptions Promulgated by Head of Federal Agency
to Cover Other Investigatory Material)
(c)(3) 5 U.S.C. § 552a(c)(3): [E]xcept for disclosures made under
subsection (b)(7) of this section, make the accounting made
under paragraph (1) of this subsection available to the
individual named in the record at his request[.]
(d) 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d): Access to records.-Each agency that
maintains a system of records shall-(1) upon request by
any individual to gain access to his record or to any
information pertaining to him which is contained in the
system, permit him and upon his request, a person of his
own choosing to accompany him, to review the record and
have a copy made of all or any portion thereof in a form
comprehensible to him, except that the agency may require
the individual to furnish a written statement authorizing
discussion of that individual's record in the accompanying
person's presence;
(2) permit the individual to request amendment of a
record pertaining to him and-
(A) not later than 10 days (excluding Saturdays,
Sundays, and legal public holidays) after the date of receipt
of such request, acknowledge in writing such receipt; and
(B) promptly, either-
(i) make any correction of any portion thereof which the
individual believes is not accurate, relevant, timely, or
complete; or
(ii) inform the individual of its refusal to amend the
record in accordance with his request, the reason for the
refusal, the procedures established by the agency for the
individual to request a review of that refusal by the head of
the agency or an officer designated by the head of the
agency, and the name and business address of that official;
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(3) permit the individual who disagrees with the refusal
of the agency to amend his record to request a review of
such refusal, and not later than 30 days (excluding
Saturdays, Sundays, and legal public holidays) from the
date on which the individual requests such review, complete
such review and make a final determination unless, for good
cause shown, the head of the agency extends such 30-day
period; and if, after his review, the reviewing official also
refuses to amend the record in accordance with the request,
permit the individual to file with the agency a concise
statement setting forth the reasons for his disagreement with
the refusal of the agency, and notify the individual of the
provisions for judicial review of the reviewing official's
determination under subsection (g)(1)(A) of this section;
(4) in any disclosure, containing information about
which the individual has filed a statement of disagreement,
occurring after the filing of the statement under paragraph
(3) of this subsection, clearly note any portion of the record
which is disputed and provide copies of the statement and,
if the agency deems it appropriate, copies of a concise
statement of the reasons of the agency for not making the
amendments requested, to persons or other agencies to
whom the disputed record has been disclosed; and
(5) nothing in this section shall allow an individual
access to any information compiled in reasonable
anticipation of a civil action or proceeding.
(e)(1) 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) Each agency that maintains a system of
records shall-
(e)(1) maintain in its records only such information about
an individual as is relevant and necessary to accomplish a
purpose of the agency required to be accomplished by
statute or by executive order of the President[.]
(e)(4)(G) 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) Each agency that maintains a system of
records shall-
(e)(4) subject to the provisions of paragraph (11) of this
subsection, publish in the Federal Register upon
establishment or revision a notice of the existence and
character of the system of records, which notice shall
include-
(e)(4)(G)("the agency procedures whereby an individual
can be notified at his request if the system of records
contains a record pertaining to him[.]
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(e)(4)(H) 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) Each agency that maintains a system of
records shall-
(e)(4) subject to the provisions of paragraph (11) of this
subsection, publish in the Federal Register upon
establishment or revision a notice of the existence and
character of the system of records, which notice shall
include-
(e)(4)(H) the agency procedures whereby an individual can
be notified at his request how he can gain access to any
record pertaining to him contained in the system of records,
and how he can contest its content") ("the agency
procedures whereby an individual can be notified at his
request how he can gain access to any record pertaining to
him contained in the system of records, and how he can
contest its content[.]
(e)(4)(I) 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) Each agency that maintains a system of
records shall-
(e)(4) subject to the provisions of paragraph (11) of this
subsection, publish in the Federal Register upon
establishment or revision a notice of the existence and
character of the system of records, which notice shall
include-
(e)(4)(I) the categories of sources of records in the systemL.]
(f) 5 U.S.C. § 552a(f) Agency rules.--In order to carry out the
provisions of this section, each agency that maintains a
system of records shall promulgate rules, in accordance
with the requirements (including general notice) of section
553 of this title, which shall-
(1) establish procedures whereby an individual can be
notified in response to his request if any system of records
named by the individual contains a record pertaining to him;
(2) define reasonable times, places, and requirements for
identifying an individual who requests his record or
information pertaining to him before the agency shall make
the record or information available to the individual;
(3) establish procedures for the disclosure to an
individual upon his request of his record or information
pertaining to him, including special procedure, if deemed
necessary, for the disclosure to an individual of medical
records, including psychological records, pertaining to him;
(4) establish procedures for reviewing a request from an
individual concerning the amendment of any record or
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information pertaining to the individual, for making a
determination on the request, for an appeal within the
agency of an initial adverse agency determination, and for
whatever additional means may be necessary for each
individual to be able to exercise fully his rights under this
section; and
(5) establish fees to be charged, if any, to any individual
for making copies of his record, excluding the cost of any
search for and review of the record.
The Office of the Federal Register shall biennially
compile and publish the rules promulgated under this
subsection and agency notices published under subsection
(e)(4) of this section in a form available to the public at low
cost.
